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BUSINESS LAW FORUM
THE PROTECTED-CLASS APPROACH TO
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW: LOGIC, EFFECTS,
REFORM

WAL-MART V DUKES: TAKING THE PROTECTION

OUT OF PROTECTED CLASSES
by
Michaelj Zimmer
Wal-Mart v. Dukes is a major 2011 procedural decision changing the
future path of class actions and maybe more. To decide the procedural
issue, the Courtfound it necessary to look to the underlying substantive
law-Title VII's systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact
theories of discrimination. This article will explore the way the Court
treated that substantive law to attempt to see if Wal-Mart is a
foreshadowing of major changes in the substance of antidiscrimination
law. To do that, it will first briefly develop the competing visions of the
underlyingpurpose of antidiscriminationlaw-whether the aim of the law
is to address subordination of classes of people protected by the law or is
simply to prohibit classifications-and trace their development since
Reconstruction through the Rehnquist Court. Next, it will develop the
earlier Roberts Court decisions in Parents Involved and Ricci v.
DeStefano leading up to Wal-Mart. These decisions show how the
anticlassification purpose and corresponding absolute color-blind rule
have come to predominate if not completely prevail.Finally getting to Wal-
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Mart, the articlefirst sketches out how Wal-Mart would be analyzed under
prior law and then describes how that substantive law was treated in the
decision itself Looking at the juxtaposition ofprior law with the approach
to substantive antidiscriminationlaw developed in Wal-Mart, the next
Part sets out the possible impact ofWal-Mart on that law. In the best case,
Wal-Mart would have no impact on Title VII's substantive law. In the
worst case, the decision foreshadows a major contraction of the systemic
theories of discriminationthat were in place before the Roberts Court era.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"No wonder kids grow up crazy. A cat's cradle is nothing but a bunch of X's
between somebody's hands, and little kids look and look and look at all those
X's. . ." "And?" "No damn cat, and no damn cradle."'
The Civil Rights Movement and its success at getting civil rights
legislation enacted is the paradigm for all antidiscrimination law.' Given
that movement and those that followed channeling the Civil Rights
Movement, it seems almost natural to describe the purpose these laws
should serve as "protecting" the "class" whose organizational efforts
finally brou ht some recognition of their plight and the enactment of
protections. With few exceptions, however, antidiscrimination statutes

1 KURT VONNEGUT,

CAT'S CRADLE 165-66 (1963).
Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and
TransforrnativePolitics, 120 HARv. L. REV. 937, 946 (2007).
A search on Westlaw of the term "protected class" in Supreme Court cases
resulted in 33 cases relevant to employment. These cases were also identified in terms
of what protected class was at issue. This resulted in 14 cases involving the protected
class of race, six cases for gender, seven for age, four for disability, and two cases that
2
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are not drafted explicitly to protect only the members of those classes.
Instead, these statutes are drafted in terms of the classifications of the
characteristics which form the protected group. Thus, § 703(a) of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer. . . to discriminate against any
individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin . . . ."5 In important ways, the collision between two
fundamentally competing purposes for these laws-antisubordination or
anticlassification-has driven the debate about the scope and nature of
the antidiscrimination project in this country. 6 If the anticlassification

were miscellaneous. These cases also differed in terms of whether the Constitution or
anti-discrimination law was the basis for the claim seeking the protection of the
particular protected class at issue. Of these cases, the Constitution was used eight
times in arguing for a protected class. The Fourteenth Amendment was raised in six
cases, the Fifteenth Amendment in two, and the Thirteenth Amendment in one case.
In other cases, federal anti-discrimination law was the basis for claims involving
protected classes. Title VII was relied on in eight cases, the Age Discrimination
Employment Act (ADEA) in six, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in six, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) in four, and Title XI, the Equal Pay Act, § 1985(3) and
§ 1584, used the term in one case each. See Memorandum from Laura Hoffman to
author, Summary of Protected Class Research 1 (May 11, 2011) (on file with author).
* The major exceptions include 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a), which provides: "All persons
... shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a) (2006)
(emphasis added). See also McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287
(1976) (holding that § 1981 protects everyone from race discrimination in contracts).
Further, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in § 701(j) defines "religion" to
require employers to reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs and practices of
workers, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) requires employers to reasonably accommodate qualified workers with a
disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (2006).
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2006). See David S. Schwartz, The Case of the Vanishing
Protected Class: Reflections on Reverse Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and Racial
Balancing, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 657, 657 ("The courts used to talk about the idea of a
'protected class,' people who were historically disadvantaged in a caste system with
white men at the top. The constitutional principles and statutory laws against
discrimination were to protect racial and ethnic minorities and women from policies
and practices, both public and private, that would tend to keep this caste system
going. [That is no longer true.] ... While the notion that we are all in one big
protected group, safe from discrimination, sounds comforting, what it really means is
that white males can bring 'reverse discrimination' cases and that 'reverse civil rights'
lawyers are on the ascendancy in attacking affirmative action."); see also Cheryl I.
Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination,Racing Test
Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 102-20 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
recent interpretations of antidiscrimination law has turned it on its head-it protects
whites but not the members of racial minority groups); Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v.
DeStefano: Diluting Disparate Impact and Redefining Disparate Treatment, 12 NEV. L.J.
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 924533.
& Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
6 See Jack M. Balkin
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003). See generally Equal
Employment Opportunity (EEO) Terminology, NAT'L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov
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purpose is adopted, it leads to a narrow scope of protection, with the
legal rule being the simple prohibition of the classification, whether or
not that helps the members of the groups who are supposedly protected
by the law. The antisubordination approach would broaden the scope of
protection in ways that should inure to the benefit of the groups that are
the historic victims of discrimination . Another way of stating the
difference between the two is that the anticlassification approach focuses
on individual perpetrators-the "few bad apples" in the barrel-while the
antisubordination purpose looks to and helps to redress the plight the
protected class suffers.
After seesawing between the two for quite some time, the question
now is whether the Roberts Court has firmly established the
anticlassification purpose for equal protection and antidiscrimination
statutes even if the resulting interpretations of those laws may have not
yet fully implemented an absolute anticlassification rule.9 We are all
members of various protected classes. Express attempts to remedy the
subordinating conditions that each group faces can be found to conflict
(noting that the Equal Employment Opportunity
/eeo/terminology.html
Commission (EEOC) defines "protected class" in a way that reflects, rather than
resolves that tension). "Protected Class: The groups protected from the employment
discrimination by law. These groups include men and women on the basis of sex; any
group which shares a common race, religion, color, or national origin; people over
40; and people with physical or mental handicaps. Every U.S. citizen is a member of
some protected class, and is entitled to the benefits of EEO law. However, the EEO
laws were passed to correct a history of unfavorable treatment of women and minority
group members." Id. Depending on how one counts, there are at least eight different
protected classes pursuant to federal statutory law. The states generally protect the
same classes as Title VII but, again, depending on how one counts, the states have
expanded the protected classes to at least 25, including such things as political views
and appearance. See Memorandum from Laura Hoffman to author, Federal AntiDiscrimination Laws (undated) (on file with author).
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107
(1976), is generally credited with articulating the two quite different ways of looking
at equal protection and antidiscrimination laws. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 665, for
a distinction regarding what discrimination means using protected class theory
("Discrimination is not differential treatment per se, but differential treatment that
arises from, and perpetuates, a caste system, a history of oppression, or exclusion of
groups based on their group characteristics.").
SeeJed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 114243 (2002) (since 1995, the Court has adopted an anti-antidiscrimination agenda that
explains a series of decisions that cannot be understood under prior doctrine or

precedent). For a classic discussion, see Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through AntidiscriminationLaw: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine,
62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978). For an analysis that, because of "pluralism anxiety," the
Court is moving away from its traditional equal protection jurisprudence toward a
liberty-based dignity jurisprudence, see Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection,
124 HAR. L. REv. 747 (2011).
' For a recent article that looks more closely at the doctrinal level that inexorably
moved to the color-blind rule, see Ian Haney L6pez, Intentional Blindness (UC
Berkeley Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 1920418), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920418.
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with an anticlassification rule.o This Article develops that idea through
the lens of the Court's recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes."
While the decision most immediately involves class action law, 2 it appears
to raise significant questions of substantive antidiscrimination law, which
will be the focus of this Article. 3 Whether or not the Court's treatment of
substantive antidiscrimination law is a restatement of the law as it stands
today, that treatment may well foreshadow the direction that the lower
courts and the Supreme Court will take in the future.
Part II traces the competition between the anticlassification and
antisubordination views of antidiscrimination law since the ratification of
the Reconstruction Amendments. Part III develops the earlier Roberts
Court decisions in Parents InvolveW4 and Ricci v. DeStefano," leading up to
Wal-Mart, showing how the anticlassification purpose and corresponding
absolute color-blind rule have come to predominate, if not completely
prevail. Part IV first sketches out how Wal-Mart would be analyzed under
prior law and then describes how substantive law was treated in the
decision itself. Looking at the juxtaposition of prior law with the
approach to substantive antidiscrimination law developed in Part IV, Part
V sets out the possible impact of Wal-Mart on that law, and Part VI
concludes.
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE ANTICLASSIFICATION-VERSUSANTISUBORDINATION COMPETITON IN THE COURTS
A complete history of the tension between an anticlassification and
an antisubordination purpose to redressing discrimination is beyond the
scope of this Article. Briefly, the conflict arose in the very earliest
interpretations of the Reconstruction Amendments that were enacted

'0 See Yoshino, supra note 8, at 747 ("pluralism anxiety"-over the extensive
numbers of protected groups-is driving the retraction of antidiscrimination law). In
a related area, the question of intersectionality claims of discrimination, the data
compiled from federal court cases from 1965 to 1999 shows that plaintiffs who make
claims of intersectional discrimination, as for example, a claim of discrimination
because the plaintiff was an African-American woman, are only half as likely to win as
plaintiffs alleging a single basis of discrimination. Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multipe
Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAw &
Soc'Y REv. 991, 992, 1009 (2011).
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2 If this Article were to focus on the procedural law of class actions along with
substantive antidiscrimination law, a more appropriate title might be 'Wal-Mart v.
Dukes: Taking the Protection and the Class Out of Protected Classes."
" Taking the procedural issues involving class action law out of the case would
leave the case as if it had been brought by the EEOC under its pattern or practice
authority. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-6(a), 2000e-6(c) (2006); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 328 n.1 (1977) (action to enforce Title VII brought by
the government, with the jurisdiction to bring these suits now within the EEOC).
" Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
1
129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
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following the Civil War."' In 1873, in the Slaughter-HouseCases,'7 the Court
rejected an argument that these amendments protected the right of
white butchers to practice their profession. The basis for rejecting their
claim was the finding that all three amendments were to be interpreted
in light of the antisubordination * purpose of protecting freed slaves from
race discrimination:
[O]n the most casual examination of the language of these
amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading
purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and
without which none of them would have been even suggested; we
mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made
freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly
exercised unlimited dominion over him.'
In light of this antisubordination purpose focusing on the plight of
African-Americans, the Court adopted a substantive interpretation of the
three amendments denying the claims of these white butchers seeking a
constitutional right to practice their profession.o
Shortly thereafter, the Court interpreted equal protection to apply
beyond what a strict anticlassification purpose or rule would reach. In
Yick Wo v. Hopkins,2 an ordinance requiring laundries to be in brick
buildings was neutral on its face as to race yet had been applied to deny
the applications of some 200 Chinese, while granting a variance from its
operation to all 80 whites who applied:

" This Article proceeds on the assumption that equal protection and disparate
treatment discrimination jurisprudence are now, if not identical, substantially the
same. See Richard Primus, The Future of DisparateImpact, 108 MICH. L. REv. 1341, 1344
(2010).
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
"Subordinate" means "placed in a lower order, class, or rank: holding a lower
or inferior position .
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2277
(Philip Babcock Gove ed., 2002) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY].
" Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 71. While not denying the possibility
of a more general application, the Court's purposive approach made that possibility
remote: "We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this protection.
Both the language and spirit of these articles are to have their fair and just weight in
any question of construction. Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind
of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of
slavery, now or hereafter.... [I]f other rights are assailed by the States which
properly and necessarily fall within the protection of these articles, that protection
will apply, though the party interested may not be of African descent." Id. at 72.
20 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 8.2, at
626 (4th ed. 2011). Soon afterwards, however, the Court began to abandon that
purpose and to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly its due process
clause, to apply broadly to protect the right to contract. Id. at 627-28.
2
118 U.S. 356 (1886). In 1880, the Court had found that the explicit exclusion
of African-Americans from juries violated equal protection. See Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil
eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to
their rights, the denial of equaljustice is still within the prohibition of
the Constitution.... [T]he conclusion cannot be resisted, that no
reason for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to
which the petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is not
22
justified.
The basic statistical evidence-the "inexorable zero" of Chinese
applicants allowed to operate laundries in wooden buildings-was
sufficient to establish an equal protection violation. With no rebuttal by
the defendants, it was appropriate to draw the inference that, without
another explanation, discrimination was the most likely reason for the
decisions that were challenged. "No reason whatever, except the will of
the supervisors, is assigned why [the Chinese applicants] should not be
permitted to carry on, in the accustomed manner, their harmless and
useful occupation, on which they depend for a livelihood."
Ten years later, in Plessy v. Ferguson,4 the Court not only failed to
follow its prior antisubordination-based precedent, but it failed to accept
even an anticlassification-based challenge to a law explicitly requiring
racially segregated railroad passenger cars. The Court's reason for not
finding the law unconstitutional was the notorious "separate but equal"
interpretation of equal protection: African-American and white
passengers were treated equally in the sense that members of both races
had a right to ride on the train and each was banned from riding in the
25
same car with members of the other race. The Court reduced racial
subordination to a mere state in the mind of its victims. The reign of de
jure segregation had begun, and it lasted until the middle of the 20th
century.
Justice Harlan's oft quoted dissent has been the basis used by both
sides of the anticlassification-versus-antisubordination debate ever since:
[I] n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74.
Id. at 374. In the Warren Court years, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
21
(1960), channeled Yick Wo. Without any express use of race, Alabama had rezoned
Tuskegee into an "uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure" that removed virtually all the
black but none of the white voters from the city. Id. at 340. The Court viewed this as
"tantamount ... to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely
Id. at 341.
concerned with ... fencing Negro citizens out of town ....
22

2

163 U.S. 537 (1896).

Id. at 537.
Id. at 551. In answer to plaintiffs argument that "enforced separation of the
2
two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority," the Court said that if
true, that was "solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon
it." Id.
'5
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caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens
are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most
powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his
surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the
supreme law of the land are involved.
From an anticlassification perspective, the key words are: "Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens." This language is used to argue that the purpose of equal
protection is anticlassification and so its scope should be limited to
prohibiting explicit race classifications and not much more. In other
words, the anticlassification color-blind purpose required a color-blind
legal rule.
From an antisubordination perspective, those words must be read in
the context of the entire paragraph that describes the antisubordination
aspirations of equal protection and not as a limiting rule narrowly
prohibiting racial classification. Thirteen years earlier, Justice Harlan
articulated the antisubordination purpose for equal protection in his
dissent in The Civil Rights Cases, "and he had not changed his mind in
2
Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). "The sure guarantee of the peace and
security of each race is the clear, distinct, unconditional recognition by our
governments, National and State, of every right that inheres in civil freedom, and of
the equality before the law of all citizens of the United States without regard to race.
State enactments, regulating the enjoyment of civil rights, upon the basis of race, and
cunningly devised to defeat legitimate results of the war, under the pretence of
recognizing equality of rights, can have no other result than to render permanent
peace impossible, and to keep alive a conflict of races, the continuance of which must
do harm to all concerned." Id. at 560-61.
" In The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Court, in interpreting the Civil
Rights Act of 1975, held that Congress lacked authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to reach private actors who discriminated on the basis of race in providing
accommodations to the public. Discrimination in public accommodations also was not
within the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment, which was limited to banning slavery.
Id. at 24-26. Justice Harlan dissented because the purpose of equal protection was to
overcome the refusal of the states to protect the rights denied to African-Americans that
white citizens took as their birthright. In other words, the Act was aimed at ending the
subordination of African-Americans: "My brethren say, that when a man has emerged
from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation
when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the
laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary
modes by which other men's rights are protected. It is, I submit, scarcely just to say that
the colored race has been the special favorite of the laws. . . . What the nation, through
Congress, has sought to accomplish in reference to that race, is-what had already been
done in every State of the Union for the white race-to secure and protect rights
belonging to them as freemen and citizens; nothing more.... The one underlying
purpose of congressional legislation has been to enable the black race to take the rank
of mere citizens. The difficulty has been to compel a recognition of the legal right of
the black race to take the rank of citizens, and to secure the enjoyment of privileges
belonging, under the law, to them as a component part of the people for whose welfare
and happiness government is ordained." Id. at 61 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The
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Plessy. By saying there is no "dominant, ruling class" Justice Harlan was
not making a factual claim. Indeed, it is clear Justice Harlan said this
precisely because it was so counterfactual.2 9 Because there clearly was a
dominant ruling class in society, he used the statement as an aspiration, a
goal, and not a legal rule for enforcing equal protection. That goal was to
end the significance of race. Ending the salience of race in our society
would mean that there no longer would be a ruling class based on race, a
color-blind society would be established, and the goal of equal protection
would be achieved.
In sum, three of these 19th century decisions-Slaughter-House,the
Civil Rights Cases, and Plessy--can be seen as consistent, despite their
conflicting statements of the purpose of equal protection, because the
scope of application of the Reconstruction Amendments was diminished
in each case. In other words, the Court articulated conflicting purposes
of equal protection but appeared to use them instrumentally to achieve a
common end, a restrictive interpretation of these amendments. While
Yick Wo might be seen as consistent with Slaughter-House in terms of the
announced purpose of equal protection, it cannot be synthesized with
any of the three cases based on their outcomes. Yick Wo interpreted equal
protection to reach beyond freed slaves to protect members of another
racial minority, the Chinese, and found that a law neutral on its face as to
race nevertheless violated the equal protection clause because of the way
it was administered.
There followed the long period during which de jure and de facto
segregation were an unfortunate fact of American life.30 With the long
and hard-fought drive of the NAACP's litigation efforts and the arrival of
the Warren Court, the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy was first

Rehnquist Court later reaffirmed the holding of The Civil Rights Cases that Congress
lacks power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to reach private action. United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
"' Whether or not race is still salient, and so Justice Harlan's aspiration for equal
protection is still far from being achieved, is a debate that continues. For an example
that race still has salience, one need look no further than the Court's recent decision in
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), where the fact that African-Americans and
Latinos had been excluded from the New Haven fire department for generations was
not the subject of much public scrutiny or debate, but the white firefighters case was the
subject of continuing media scrutiny from the moment the issue arose. See Justice
Ginsburg's dissenting opinion, id. at 2690; Ralph Richard Banks, Beyond Colorblindness:
Neo-Racialism and the Future of Race and Law Scholarship, 25 HARV. BIAcKLETTER L.J. 41
(2009), availableat http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/blj/vol25/41-56.pdf.
w For example, the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt left race discrimination as
it existed without redress. SeeJuan F. Perea, The Echoes of Slavery: Recognizing the Racist
Origins of the Agricultural and Domestic Worker Exclusion from the National Labor Relations
Act, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 96-100 (2011) (showing how the exclusion of agricultural
and domestic workers from the protections of the newly enacted national labor law
was the result of pressure from Southern Democrats who would not support a law
that would protect African-Americans, who were concentrated in agricultural and
domestic employment).
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rejected as to public education in Brown v. Board of Education" and then
repudiated generally in subsequent cases." In Loving v. Virginia, the
Virginia miscegenation statute that prohibited marriage between a white
and a "colored person" violated equal protection even though both
parties to such a marriage would be punished equally: "[W]e reject the
notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing racial
classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the
Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious racial
discriminations . .. ."
The miscegenation law was unconstitutional
because it was emblematic of white supremacy and African-American
subordination. "The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages
involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must
stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White
Supremacy."35
The Civil Rights Movement had success in Congress as well as in the
courts. Most importantly for this Article, in response to the Movement,
Congress enacted the first meaningful antidiscrimination legislation in
the 20th century with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3" The first major
substantive decision by the Supreme Court interpreting Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act came in the Burger Court era. In it, the Court adopted
an aggressively antisubordination approach to Title VII and adopted a
legal rule that reached beyond prohibiting classifications based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin-and beyond intentional
discrimination. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,37 the Court was faced with the
employer's adoption of employment prerequisites-a high school
diploma requirement and a standardized test-that had a disparate
impact on the job prospects of African-Americans." The lower courts
found that these prerequisites were neutral on their face as to race and
had not been adopted with an intent to discriminate.3 9 From the
anticlassification viewpoint that the lower court adopted, the use of these
prerequisites was no violation. Nevertheless, the Court, in an opinion by

3'
3'

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
For a description of the litigation campaign of the NAACP Legal Defense

Fund, see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: LEGAL BATTLES OF THE CIVIL

RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2004). For the development of the effect of social movements

and their impact on Supreme Court jurisprudence, see Jack Balkin & Reva B. Siegel,
Pinciples,Practices,and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 927 (2006).
" 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
31
Id. at 8.
Id. at 11.
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38,
77 Stat. 56, preceded Title VII but its narrow focus limited its impact, while Title VII
was drafted very broadly. Shortly after adopting Title VII, Congress enacted the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602.
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Id. at 425-26.
Id. at 428-29.
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Chief Justice Burger, interpreted Title VII to be able to challenge
employer practices that had continued to subordinate members of
minority groups.40 Employer practices or policies that had a disparate
racial impact would violate Title VII absent proof by the employer that
the practice was job related and necessary for business.4 ' The key basis for
such an expansive interpretation was the Court's focus on the historic
victims of discrimination and not on the intentional acts of the
perpetrators of discrimination:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from
the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to
favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees.... Congress has now required that the posture and
condition of the job seeker be taken into account.... The Act
proscribes not only overt discrimination but41 also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.
Since Griggs, disparate impact theory has been an important focus of the
debate over anticlassification versus antisubordination. "Reverse"
discrimination and affirmative action is the other.
The Griggs antisubordination-based theory of disparate impact
discrimination potentially came into conflict with an anticlassification
rule shortly thereafter in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.44
Two white employees claimed that their right to equal treatment had
been violated when they, but not an African-American employee who was
also implicated, had been discharged for stealing. The lower courts had
found that Title VII did not protect white workers from race
discrimination. 6 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, reversed,
finding that, by its terms and by the intent of Congress, Title VII was
enacted to protect all employees from discrimination without regard to
4o
41

Id. at 430.
Id. at 436.

" Id. at 429-31. The Court referred to one of Aesop's Fables to bolster the breadth
of the interpretation it had adopted: "Congress has now provided that tests or criteria
for employment or promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the
sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. .. . It has .. . provided that the
vessel in which the milk is proffered be one all seekers can use." Id. at 431.
" In the same time period, the Burger Court took an expansive view of how
claims of individual disparate treatment should be treated. In McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), the Court adopted a way of proving individual
disparate treatment discrimination using a procedural mechanism to allow drawing
the inference of discrimination when other likely nondiscriminatory grounds for the
adverse action had been eliminated. This process-of-elimination way of proving
discrimination looked at discrimination from the viewpoint of the difficulties workers
have proving discrimination where much of the potentially relevant information is in
the hands of the employer.
" 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
'
46

Id. at 276.

Id. at 277.

HeinOnline -- 16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 419 2012

420

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:2

their race. "Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white
petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be applicable
were they Negroes and [the allegedly more favorably treated employee]
white."4 And again, "[t]he Act prohibits all racial discrimination in
employment, without exception for any group of particular employees."
Further, the Court also interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a survivor of postCivil War civil rights legislation, which by its terms appeared to be aimed
at protecting the contracting rights of African-Americans, and not of
whites. It provides that: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . ."4 The Court
nevertheless interpreted § 1981 to protect whites against race
discrimination because the broad purpose of the statute was to give
everyone a right not to be discriminated against because of their race.
While accepting that unexplained unequal treatment violated Title
VII, McDonald is ultimately consistent with the antisubordination
perspective of discrimination because it added a new way to prove
intentional disparate treatment discrimination. McDonald did not limit
the scope of Title VII, but expanded its application in a way that served
its antisubordination purpose.
From the perspective of the systemic theories of discrimination, the
zenith of the antisubordination perspective of Title VII came in 1977.
The Court adopted the theory of systemic disparate treatment
discrimination based on proof that the employer's standard operating
procedure-its pattern or practice of operations-was to discriminate
intentionally on the basis of race. In InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States," the employer, a large trucking company, employed a
significant number of African-American and Latino workers, including
some working as city truck drivers, but there was an "inexorable zero"5 2 of
them assigned to the preferred job of over-the-road driver.5 3 Even in the
absence of any express policy that excluded minority workers from these
more lucrative jobs, the Court, nevertheless, found the employer had

47

Id. at 280.

48Id. at

283.

" Id. at 285 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a) (2006)).
5 Id. at 286-87, 289. "[W]e cannot accept the view that the terms of § 1981
exclude its application to racial discrimination against white persons. On the
contrary, the statute explicitly applies to 'all persons' (emphasis added), including
white persons. While a mechanical reading of the phrase 'as is enjoyed by white
citizens' would seem to lend support to respondents' reading of the statute, we have
previously described this phrase simply as emphasizing 'the racial character of the
rights being protected."' Id. at 287 (quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791
(1966)).
5 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
' "Inexorable" means relentless, "not to be persuaded or moved by entreaty or
prayer." WEBSTER's DICTIONARY, supra note 18, at 1157.
SInt'1 Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 328-35.
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violated Title VII." Bolstering the basic statistical showing" with
anecdotes of the employer's discrimination against individuals, the Court
found that the employer was liable because the exclusion was "because of
race."
In response to the employer's claim that statistical evidence could
not be used to prove discrimination, the Court relied on the generalprobability theory, of statistics to uphold their use. That AfricanAmericans and Latinos were completely excluded from the more
desirable over-the-road driver jobs even though they were available called
for an explanation if the inference of discrimination was to be avoided.
The employer tried to explain the absence of minority line drivers by
claiming that its over-the-road the drivers had all been hired before Title
VII became effective. The Court found no evidence in the record to
support that claim." Another explanation for the absence of minority
over-the-road drivers might have been that few African-Americans and
Latinos were available to fill the jobs. But the record foreclosed that
explanation because it showed that the employer had assigned African-

Id. at 342-43.
The statistics were as follows: "[S]hortly after the Government filed its
complaint alleging systemwide discrimination, the company had 6,472 employees. Of
these, 314 (5%) were Negroes and 257 (4%) were Spanish-surnamed Americans. Of
the 1,828 line drivers, however, there were only 8 (0.4%) Negroes and 5 (0.3%)
Spanish-surnamed persons, and all of the Negroes had been hired after the litigation
had commenced. With one exception-a man who worked as a line driver at the
Chicago terminal from 1950 to 1959-the company and its predecessors did not employ
a Negro on a regular basis -as a line driver until 1969. And, as the Government showed,
even in 1971, there were terminals in areas of substantial Negro population where all
of the company's line drivers were white. A great majority of the Negroes (83%) and
Spanish-surnamed Americans (78%) who did work for the company held the lower
paying city operations and serviceman jobs, whereas only 39% of the nonminority
employees held jobs in those categories." Id. at 337-38 (footnotes omitted).
5 Id. at 338-43. Other than some anecdotal evidence of individual
discrimination, the Court in Teamsters did not focus on the acts of any of the agents of
the employer, for whom the employer would be liable because of respondeat
superior. It found the employer, qua employer, directly liable because of its pattern of
discrimination. Section 701 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) defines the term
"employer" to mean "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and
any agent of such a person . . . ." "Person engaged in industry" includes natural
persons but also corporations, partnerships, and the like. See Tristin K. Green, The
Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 395, 423 &
n.115 (2011).
" Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 & n.20. "Statistics showing racial or
ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only because such
imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it
is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result
in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of
the population in the community from which employees are hired. Evidence of
longlasting and gross disparity between the composition of a work force and that of
the general population thus may be significant. . . ." Id.
" Id. at 340-41.
54
"
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Americans and Latinos to the less desirable city driver jobs and that the
communities where the company O erated included minority group
members available to be truck drivers.
The basic statistical evidence in Teamsters was simple, straightforward
but powerful because it virtually eliminated any explanation for the
"inexorable zero" of minority line drivers other than discrimination. In
Hazelwood School District v. United States,6o the basic statistics were less stark
but the Court relied on a more sophisticated statistical technique-a
binomial distribution 6"-that is based on probability theory and is used to
analyze basic statistical data.6 2
Teamsters and Hazelwood set a high water mark for an
antisubordination approach to systemic discrimination. The beginning of
the turn away from the antisubordination perspective and towards the
anticlassification view began in 1976 when the Court rejected a claim that
proof that a governmental practice resulted in disparate impact violated
equal protection.6 3 In Washington v. Davis, 4 plaintiffs challenged on equal
5
Id. at 337. In Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978) (where
the sample size too was small to be able to produce useful statistical analysis), the
Court connected probability statistics with the process-of-elimination approach to
proving discrimination. "[W]e are willing to presume [discrimination] largely
because we know from our experience that more often than not people do not act in
a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business
setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been
eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not
the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision
on an impermissible consideration such as race." Id. at 577.
6
433 U.S. 299 (1977).
" Binomial distribution is a technique to compare the relationship, or lack
thereof, of two variables. But other probability-based techniques, such as multiple
regression, can also be utilized to analyze the influence of many more variables. See

WAYNE C. CURTIS, STATISTICAL CONCEPTS FOR ATTORNEYS: A REFERENCE GUIDE 62-63,

165 (1983). In Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986), for example, the plaintiffs used
a multiple regression study comparing four variables-race, education, tenure, and
job title-to determine whether there was continuing salary discrimination against
some black workers. Holding all those variables constant, the study found that the
null hypothesis that salary and race were unrelated should be rejected. The

statistically significant relationship between race and pay was the basis for drawing the
inference that the difference in salary between white and black workers was the result
of discrimination. Id. at 398-99. The advantage of multiple regression is that any
number of relevant variables can be compared to determine their effect; its
disadvantage is that the variable against which the others are to be compared must be
continuous, like dollars of salary. See CURTIS, supra, at 153-54, 159, 165.
" The basic statistics showed that over 15% of the teachers in the labor market
were African-Americans, but less than 2% of the defendant's teachers were AfricanAmericans. Even excluding the teacher population of the City of St. Louis, the 5.7%
population versus 1.8% of the Hazelwood's teachers was sufficient to reject the null
hypothesis that race and employment were not related. That evidence would support
drawing the inference that the shortfall of minority teachers was because of race.
Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308 & n.14.
" Politics had begun to include pushback against civil rights for minority group
members in the latter part of the 1960s. See L6pez, supra note 9, at 9 ("[E]qual
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protection grounds a pen-and-pencil personnel test that had an adverse
impact on African-American applicants to the D.C. police academy. The
Court distinguished the use of equal protection from Title VII's disparate
impact theory because the Constitution reached only purposeful
discrimination: "[Ojur cases have not embraced the proposition that a
law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact."6' In 1979, in Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 6 the Court adopted a very stringent approach to
proving discriminatory purpose: "'Discriminatory purpose' . . . implies

more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It
implies that the decisionmaker . .. selected ...

a particular course of

action at least in part 'because o 'not merely 'in spite of' its adverse effects
upon an identifiable group."" Mere knowledge of the extreme gender
consequences of its action was not sufficient to trigger equal protection.
The next move towards an anticlassification purpose and rule was
taken in response to attacks by whites claiming voluntary affirmative
action, undertaken to redress the historic subordination faced by
members of racial minority groups, violated their right to equal
protection. At the constitutional level, the change started with Regents of
619
the University of California v. Bakke, which involved a challenge to an
affirmative action plan designed to enhance minority enrollment at a
state medical school. With the Court split 4-4, the opinion of Justice
Powell became the opinion for the Court, even though no other Justice
joined it." He rejected the idea that reserving a specific number of seats
protection's transmogrification since the 1970s follows most fundamentally from a
broad backlash against civil rights that resulted in the election of presidents, and in
turn the appointment of justices, hostile toward racial progress."); Reva B. Siegel,
Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles
over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1470,1521-22 (2004) ("In 1968, Richard Nixon ran for
office by campaigning against the Warren Court on issues of race. ... Nixon and his
audience understood the tacit racial reference" when he focused on "busing" and
"law and order.").
6

426 U.S. 229 (1976).

Id. at 239.
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
67
Id. at 279 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted). In Davis,
the evidence did show that a higher percentage of African-Americans failed the test
than whites, nevertheless, "44% of new police force recruits had been black. . . ."
Washington, 426 U.S. at 235. In contrast, in Feeney, the absolute veterans preference
virtually excluded all women applicants for ajob because 98% of veterans at that time
were male. Id. at 270. Thus, any time a veteran-and veterans were overwhelmingly
male-applied for ajob, that excluded all nonveterans, including almost all women.
6
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279-81. "It would thus be disingenuous to say that the
adverse consequences of this legislation for women were unintended, in the sense
that they were not volitional or in the sense that they were not foreseeable." Id. at 278.
See alsoYoshino, supra note 8, at 764.
6

6

438 U.S. 265 (1978).

70

Id. at 269, 271.
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in medical school for members of racial minorities was justified by the
subordination those groups suffered: "[T] he purpose of helping certain
groups whom the faculty of the Davis Medical School perceived as victims
of 'societal discrimination' does not justify a classification that imposes
disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who bear no responsibility
for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program
are thought to have suffered."' But, the race of an applicant could be
considered as a "plus" in considering the applicant's overall qualifications
to achieve the non-racial objective of educational diversity and as long as
all the applicants were considered for all of the available seats in the
school.
In essence, race could be used to serve compelling
governmental interests but redressing the racial subordination minorities
face in society in general was not one of them. Thus, the
antisubordination purpose of equal protection was insufficient to trump
a claim by a white person based on an anticlassification rule.
Finding the efforts to redress the social subordination suffered by
minority group members to be in conflict with equal protection is an
echo of the Court's approach in Plessy. There, racial subordination could
not be reached by law because the subordination was said to exist only in
the minds of its victims and was beyond the reach of the law. In Bakke, the
effects of societal discrimination and racial subordination could not be
directly addressed by the use of race to aid those who were subordinate.
Along with attacks on the disparate impact theory of discrimination,
these affirmative action or "reverse" discrimination cases have been the
locus of the move toward an anticlassification purpose and general color73
blind rule of equal protection.
After Feeney and Bakke, equal protection law divided in two, with all
race classifications, even those used to help the historic victims of

Id. at 310.
See id. at 318. "The applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another
candidate receiving a 'plus' on the basis of ethnic background will not have been
foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because he was not the right
color or had the wrong surname. It would mean only that his combined
qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjective factors, did not
outweigh those of the other applicant. His qualifications would have been weighed
fairly and competitively, and he would have no basis to complain of unequal
treatment. . . ." Id. Subsequently, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995), the Court, in a challenge to an affirmative action requirement in a public
contract, held that all racial classifications, even for antidiscrimination purposes, are
judged by strict scrutiny, with the only compelling governmental interests being
remedying the past discrimination of the party using affirmative action, as well as
educational diversity, pursuant to Bakke. In Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003),
the Court, in a case challenging the affirmative action plan of the University of
Michigan, reaffirmed the approach Justice Powell had articulated in Bakke.
" See Michelle Adams, Is Integration a DiscriminatoryPurpose?, 96 IoWA L. REV. 837,
847 (2011) (noting that with the exception of the Michigan Law School affirmative
action plan, "the Supreme Court has invalidated every single [voluntary] racialclassification scheme that benefited a racial minority").
7

72
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discrimination, subject to strict scrutiny, while actions neutral on their
face could only be challenged with proof of animus or malice of the
decisionmakers. Since express racial classifications had come to be only
those that aided members of racial minority groups, the white
challengers had relatively easy cases. Because explicit race classifications
disadvantaging minority groups had become much less common,
minority group challengers faced an extremely difficult rule of proof to
show an equal protection violation. 4
Following Bakke, the Court, in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,
dealt with a voluntary affirmative action plan adopted by a private
employer and its union that was challenged as violating Title VII. Because
a policy requiring that craftjobs be filled with outside applicants who had
prior craft experience resulted in no African-American craft workers in
the plant," the employer and the union, under pressure from the
government, established an internal training program for craft jobs.
Unskilled incumbent workers were selected for the program, using a oneAfrican-American for one-white basis. An unskilled white worker, who
had greater seniority than some African-American workers who were
being selected for the craft training program, brought a Title VII claim
based on an equal treatment theory of discrimination. In rejecting
Weber's claim, the Court did not take the step taken the year before in
Bakke of finding efforts to address racial subordination to be in conflict
with the purposes of antidiscrimination law. Instead, the Court looked to
the antisubordination purpose underlying the enactment of Title VII to
77
reject plaintiffs anticlassification argument. In light of that purpose,
voluntary affirmative action plans do not violate Title VII because
employers and unions were expected to take race conscious efforts to
end the exclusion of blacks from good jobs:
The very statutory words intended as a spur or catalyst to cause
"employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their
employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as
possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious
7L6pez,
7

supra note 9, at 36-37.

443 U.S. 193 (1979).

" Id. at 198 (noting that the craft unions in the area excluded African-Americans
from membership, and therefore from the union-run apprenticeship programs).
'
The Court said: "Congress' primary concern in enacting the prohibition
against racial discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with 'the
plight of the Negro in our economy.' Id. at 202 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6548
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)). "Before 1964, blacks were largely relegated to
'unskilled and semi-skilled jobs."' Id. (quoting same). "Congress feared that the goals
of the Civil Rights Act-the integration of blacks into the mainstream of American
society-could not be achieved unless this trend were reversed. And Congress
recognized that that would not be possible unless blacks were able to secure jobs
'which have a future.'" Id. at 202-03 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 7204 (remarks of Sen.
Clark)). "Given this legislative history, we cannot agree with respondent that
Congress intended to prohibit the private sector from taking effective steps to
accomplish the goal that Congress designed Title VII to achieve." Id. at 204.
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page in this country's history" cannot be interpreted as an
absolute prohibition against all private, voluntary, race-conscious
affirmative action efforts to hasten the elimination of such
*781
vestiges.
In 1988, two years into the Rehnquist Court era, the Court decided
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust.7 The decision sent messages in two
ultimately conflicting directions. First, the Court held that subjective
employment policies and practices as well as objective ones could be
challenged using the disparate impact theory of discrimination:
[D]isparate impact analysis is in principle no less applicable to
subjective employment criteria than to objective or standardized
tests. In either case, a facially neutral practice, adopted without
discriminatory intent, may have effects that are indistinguishable
from intentionally discriminatory practices. It is true, to be sure, that
an employer's policy of leaving promotion decisions to the
unchecked discretion of lower level supervisors should itself raise no
inference of discriminatory conduct.. . . It does not follow, however,
that the particular supervisors to whom this discretion is delegated
always act without discriminatory intent. Furthermore, even if one
assumed that any such discrimination can be adequately policed

" Id. at 204 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
In Johnson v. TransportationAgency, Santa Clara County, California, 480 U.S. 616 (1987),

the Court reaffirmed Weber in a case involving an affirmative action plan benefitting
women.
Weber shows that race was quite salient in 1979. Weber challenged this craft
training program that would not have existed but for the push by the government to
get its contractors to take affirmative action to expand the employment opportunities
for members of racial minority groups. If Weber's suit had been successful, the
employer and union would have no reason to continue the craft training program. If
the program was abolished, that would leave Weber in his unskilled job. To put this
into the terms of the salience of race, Weber valued challenging a program because it
benefitted African-Americans over his own self interest of ultimately moving into a
craft job.
Demographic statistics demonstrate the continuing economic differences
between African-Americans and Latinos and whites, but the general public is now
more likely to attribute those differences to reasons other than race. See Trina Jones,
Anti-Discrimination Law in Peril?, 75 Mo. L. REv. 423, 427-28 (2010) ("In 2009, the

poverty rate for African-Americans and Latinos is more than double that of Whites.
The median income of African-American and Latino families is less than two-thirds
that of white families. African-Americans and Latinos tend to disproportionately
occupy lower-paying and lower-status jobs, and their unemployment rate is
substantially higher than Whites. In addition, African-American and Latino men and
women earn less than three-quarters of white men's median annual earnings, and
African-Americans and Latinos are almost twice as likely as Whites to drop out of high
school. Although the statistical evidence of racial inequality is almost as alarming
today as it was in 1963 and 1978, the inference drawn from the data is vastly different.
Instead of identifying discrimination as a likely cause of observed disparities, some
contemporary Americans seem more inclined to look for other justifications or
explanations.").
7

487 U.S. 977 (1988).
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through disparate treatment analysis, the problem of subconscious
stereotypes and prejudices would remain.so
to
is susceptible
decisionmaking
Recognizing that subjective
discrimination and that stereotypes do affect decisionmaking expands
the scope of application of antidiscrimination law by looking at how
those decisions can be discriminatory even in absence of an express
policy of discrimination or of evidence sufficient to infer an intent to
discriminate.
Second, dicta in Watson pointed in another direction and
foreshadowed a substantial retrenchment of the underpinnings of
disparate impact theory. Instead of looking at how disparate impact law
could reach unjustified practices that caused an impact on protected
groups-the antisubordination perspective-the Court expressed fear
that the potential of disparate impact liability could be an incentive for
employers to use racial quotas to avoid the risk of disparate impact
liability. This resonates with the anticlassification perspective." To reduce
the incentive to use quotas, Justice O'Connor suggested moving the
burden of proving business necessity from the employer to a burden on
the plaintiffs to prove the absence of job relatedness and business
.82
necessity.
A year later, the Court decided the most notorious of a number of
decisions in which it narrowed civil rights protections: Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio. In Wards Cove, the Court adopted Justice O'Connor's
proposal of putting the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff to prove
that the challenged employer practice was notjob related or not justified
by business needs, thereby watering down the rule from one of necessity
to "business justification." In effect, this decision narrowed disparate
impact law significantly by folding disparate impact law into disparate
treatment law. That would make Title VII's disparate impact theory
equivalent to the rational basis test used in equal protection analysis of
laws that are neutral on their face as to race.

80 Id. at 990. The Court analogized a practice with disparate impact to intentional
discrimination because the consequences on the workers is the same in both: "Ifan
employer's undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking has precisely the same
effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination, it is difficult
to see why Title VII's proscription against discriminatory actions should not apply."
Id. at 990-91.
8' Id. at 993 ("If quotas and preferential treatment become the only cost-effective
means of avoiding expensive litigation and potentially catastrophic liability, such
measures will be widely adopted.").
82 According to Justice O'Connor, the Griggs "formulation [of business necessity]
should not be interpreted as implying that the ultimate burden of proof can be
shifted to the defendant. On the contrary, the ultimate burden of proving that
discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a specific employment
practice remains with the plaintiff at all times." Id. at 997.
" Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
81 Id. at 657-59.
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Congress responded to the Rehnquist Court's sharp turn away from
the antisubordination-based interpretations of antidiscrimination law of
the Warren and Burger Courts"' by enacting the Civil Rights Act of
1991.8 Specifically in response to Wards Cove, Title VII was amended to
move the disparate impact theory from a judicially based interpretation
of the basic prohibition of discrimination in § 703(a) to an express
codification in § 703(k) .
In sum, over the history of the judicial interpretation of the equal
protection concept in constitutional law and of antidiscrimination
statutes up until the Roberts Court, the Court has shifted focus from
antisubordination to anticlassification views. The Warren Court set the
highpoint of the antisubordination view of antidiscrimination law in
equal protection, but the Burger Court generally maintained and, in
some ways, expanded that approach in interpreting antidiscrimination
statutes. When faced with claims by whites challenging affirmative action
plans," the Burger Court moved toward the anticlassification perspective
for equal protection but continued to focus on the antisubordination
perspective for interpreting Title VII. In terms of antidiscrimination
statutes, the attempt by the Rehnquist Court to move the law toward a
narrow, anticlassification rule was rebuffed by Congress in its enactment
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

' This is not to say that the Burger Court consistently followed the
antisubordination approach of the Warren Court. Cf McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas created a way for individual plaintiffs
to prove discrimination without evidence of admissions against interest by agents of
the defendant. It allowed plaintiffs to prove discrimination through a process of
elimination of possible nondiscriminatory explanations thereby creating a basis for
inferring the employer's intent to discriminate. On the other hand, the Court then
cabined McDonnell Douglas by leaving the ultimate burden of proving discrimination
on the plaintiff and only imposing a burden on the employer to introduce evidence
of "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons" in response to plaintiffs prima facie case.
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
8
Id. §§ 3(2), 105(a). Section 703(k) is a compromise of the pre-Wards Cove law
with the Court's decision in Wards Cove. The burden of persuasion on the defense was
returned to the employer but the standard for that defense was softened. Instead of
the job related and necessary for business standard of Griggs, the standard was to show
that "the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). A
surrebuttal to that affirmative defense that was established in Wards Cove was carried
over into the new approach so the plaintiff could still win by proving the existence of
"an alternative employment practice [that the employer] refuses to adopt." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (k) (1) (A) (ii).
" L6pez, supra note 9, at 36, marks the Court's decision in Feeney as the turning
point away from the use of antidiscrimination law to protect the historic victims of
discrimination toward the protection of the white majority.
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III. THE ROBERTS COURT AND ANTICLASSIFICATION THEORY
BEFORE WAL-MART
Since 2005, the Roberts Court has moved both equal protection and
antidiscrimination statutory law further toward the anticlassification
perspective by moving toward, if not as yet expressly adopting, a general
"color-blind" rule of what constitutes discrimination. Two cases that
demonstrate that movement and set the context for discussing Wal-Mart
are ParentsInvolved 9 and Ricci v. DeStefano.o
Parents Involved, decided in 2007, involved the issue of the
constitutionality of the use of the race of individual students by school
boards as part of a system of assigning students to their respective
schools.9' The purpose of using race was to avoid the resegregation of the
schools. 92 While two school districts were involved, they both used a
modified "student choice" approach to assign students to their schools.93
If the parents' choices would lead to the school of choice being
overcrowded, students with siblings at the desired school were chosen
ahead of others.9 4 If the assignment of siblings would still leave the school
overcrowded, then a third step used the race of the individual students to
make the assignment.5 Parents challenged these assignment policies
because of the use of race at the final step, even though few assignments
ever reached that step.96 Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court,
finding that this use of race violated equal protection because it was not
justified by the compelling governmental interest required by the strict
scrutiny rule." Avoiding the return of de facto segregation was not a
compelling governmental interest so it could not justify the use of the
race of individual students for school assignments, even though
resegregation of schools would likely result in harm to minority
communities." In Part IV, which was not the opinion of the Court
because only four Justices joined it, the Chief Justice claimed to rely on
Brown v. Board of Education for the dramatic proposition that he used to
close his opinion: "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is
to stop discriminating on the basis of race."

"Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
9
"

92
93

Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
ParentsInvolved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 709-11.
id.
Id.

" Id. at 711-12.
15

Id. at 712.

96

Id. at 713.

* Id. at 730-32.

Id. at 736-37. And majority communities as well, if one believes that ending
the salience of race is desirable.
" Id. at 748.
9
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Since Justice Kennedy's vote was necessary to the decision, his
concurring opinion limited the scope of the Court's decision short of an
absolute ban on the express use of race. He objected to the broad
finishing flourish of Chief Justice Robert's opinion: "[P]arts of the
opinion by the Chief Justice imply an all-too-unyielding insistence that
race cannot be a factor in instances when, in my view, it may be taken
into account. The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate
interest government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity
regardless of their race.,",00 Justice Kennedy divided the use of race into
two categories. 0 ' First, school boards violate equal protection if they use
the race of individual students when assigning them to schools.102 Thus,
he joined the first part of the Chief Justice's opinion to the extent it
found the use of the race of individual students to make school
assignments violated equal protection. Second, school boards are not
prohibited from using race in the planning stages of operating a school
district that take place before the individual students are assigned to their
schools.0 3 It is this second use of race that parts company with the Chief
Justice's articulation of an absolute color-blind rule. At this earlier stage
of organizing the district, school boards may use the projected racial
composition of the district to avoid resegregation in siting schools and
drawing assignment zones for them.
The basis for applying the anticlassification-based color-blind rule
when children were being assigned to schools but not the use of race
before it was used individually is based on Justice Kennedy's adoption of
the antisubordination purpose of equal protection first articulated by
Justice Harlan in Plessy. For Justice Kennedy, the statement that "[o]ur
Constitution is color-blind" is "an aspiration" that "[i] n the real world ...
cannot be a universal constitutional principle.,0 o For him, school boards
can act to achieve a racially diverse student body by using race at the

'" Id. at 787-88 (Kennedy, J. concurring). Because school boards can act to
provide equal opportunity to all students, they cannot be denied the use of race to
avoid the resegregation of the schools. "The plurality's postulate that '[t]he way to
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,'
is not sufficient to decide these cases. Fifty years of experience since [Brown] should
teach us that the problem before us defies so easy a solution. School districts can seek
to reach Brown's objective of equal educational opportunity. The plurality opinion is
at least open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to
ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling. I cannot endorse that
conclusion. To the extent the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates
that state and local school authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in
schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken." Id. at 788 (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
.o.
Justice Kennedy does not appear to accept or apply conventional strict
scrutiny analysis of race classifications.
ParentsInvolved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 788-89.
0o

Id. at 789.

'o' Id. at 788 (alteration in original) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
559 (1896) (Harlan,J., dissenting)).
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aggregate, planning level without violating equal protection.xos Using race
in the planning process to achieve a diverse student body in order to
provide equal opportunity to all students may prevent resegregation,
while using the racial identity of individual students is a "[c]rude"
measure that threatens "to reduce children to racial chits valued [to be]
traded according to one school's supply and another's demand."'O
Justice Kennedy's analysis in Parents Involved in some, but not all, ways
echoes Justice Powell's approach in Bakke Acting on the basis of an
individual's race alone violates equal protection but race can be used
when it is not individualized but is part of a mix of factors relevant to a
governmental decision. What is different is that Justice Powell puts his
approach into the rubric of strict scrutiny analysis and Justice Kennedy
does not. Further, Justice Kennedy accepts a race-related objectiveproviding equal opportunity for all by preventing resegregation-that
Justice Powell would reject because it addresses societal discrimination.
For Justice Powell, the governmental purpose must be non-racial, thus,
he accepts the use of race to achieve educational diversity but not racial
diversity. In other words, Justice Kennedy accepts the use of race to
address the subordination of members of racial minority groups as long
as that use stops short of its use as to individuals.
In Parents Involved, four Justices-Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Thomas and Alito-by joining in the Chief Justice's flamboyant
statement at the end of Part IV of his opinion, appear ready for the Court
to move beyond the strict scrutiny standard to adopt an absolute
prohibition on the use of race by the government in all circumstances.
Since he does not follow the strict scrutiny test for those uses of race he
finds acceptable, Justice Kennedy's general rule seems to be that the
government can use race in the aggregate to achieve integrative goals
with the exception that race cannot be used to identify and act upon
individuals because of their race.

1o5 Id. at 788-89. "If school authorities
are concerned that the student-body
compositions of certain schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal
educational opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise race-conscious
measures to address the problem in a general way and without treating each student
in different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race.
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse
backgrounds and races. . . ." The scope of the permissible use of race includes the
"strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special
programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking
enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race." Id.
1o' Id. at 798. In contrast, using race in the district's planning process is not such
a crude measure. "These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different
treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by
race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found
permissible." Id. at 789.
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In 2009, the Court decided the New Haven firefighters' case, Ricci v.
DeStefano.'o' It involved a Title VII claim that the City had committed
intentional disparate treatment discrimination when it decided not to use
the results of a civil service promotion test because, if used, the results
would result in a disparate impact on minority test takers. 0 s Plaintiffs
were 17 whites and one Hispanic who would have been eligible for
promotion if the test results were used.'on The City's defense was its fear
of Title VII disparate impact liability if it used the test scores.o In an
opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court decided that, as a matter of law,
the City committed disparate treatment discrimination by deciding not to
use the test scores."' In finding that disparate treatment discrimination
could occur when an employer acted to avoid potential disparate impact
liability, the Court for the first time recognized a conflict between the two
main theories of discrimination."' By knowing the racial consequences,
at least in the aggregate, 1 3 of using the test scores would result in an
adverse affect on the minority test takers, the City, according to the
Court, committed disparate treatment discrimination.1 1 4 Needing to find
a way to resolve the new conflict it had created between the disparate
impact and disparate treatment provisions of Title VII, the Court

o' 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). For an interesting discussion of Ricci in context of the
social movement that led to the creation of the disparate impact theory, see Susan D.
Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VIDisparateImpact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REv. 251
(2011).
o Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
0o

Id. at 2671.

110 Id.

...Id. at 2681.

See Helen Norton, The Supreme Court's Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum
Understandingof Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197, 223-24 (2010) ("Although Title
VII's separate disparate treatment and disparate impact prohibitions had long been
considered complementary tools for addressing barriers to equal opportunity, the
Ricci majority interpreted them for the first time as potentially antagonistic.").
Finding a conflict reveals how far the Court has moved away from the
antisubordination purpose of antidiscrimination law. Antisubordination theory would
"be understood to bar those government actions that have the intent or the effect of
perpetuating traditional patterns of hierarchy." Id. at 206. See also Charles A. Sullivan,
Ricci v. DeStefano: End of the Line orJust Another Turn on the DisparateImpact Road?, 104
Nw. U. L. REv. 411, 413 (2010) (framing the statutory question after Ricci: "[D]oes an
employer who rejects an employment practice that disparately impacts blacks (thus
jumping out of the disparate impact pan) necessarily intentionally discriminate
against whites (thus landing in the disparate treatment fire)?").
113 The City did not know the scores of the
individual test takers when it was
making its decision. Nor did the test takers know their scores when the City made its
decision.
11
See Norton, supra note 112, at 229 ("The Court now ... appears to treat a
decision maker's attention to the disparities experienced by members of traditionally
subordinated racial groups-that is, its antisubordination ends-as inextricable from
an intent to discriminate against others, and thus sufficiently suspicious to demand
justification. Ricci may thus reflect a dramatic shift to a new, zero-sum understanding
of equality.").
112
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established a defense to the disparate treatment claim if, when the
employer acted, it had a "strong basis in evidence" that it would violate
the disparate impact provisions of Title VII by using the test scores for
promotions."' Reversing summary judgment for the City, the Court
granted, as a matter of law, summary judgment for the plaintiffs.16 It
found that the City did not have sufficiently strong evidence that it would
be liable to the minority test takers if the test scores were used." 7
The test results had an impact on all the members of the three
different racial groups of test takers-whites, Hispanics and AfricanAmericans.'18 Some members of each racial group would be promoted
(or be promotable) if the test scores were used, but each racial group
also included some test takers who would not be promoted and who
would get another chance for promotion in whatever procedure the City
adopted to replace the test."" Correspondingly, the City knew that by not
using the test scores there would be an adverse effect on the white test
takers. Based on the City's knowledge of the aggregate results on all
three racial groups, the Court found that, "[t]he City's actions would
violate the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some valid
defense. All the evidence demonstrates that the City chose not to certify

' Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675-76.
"' Id. at 2681. See Melissa Hart, ProceduralExtremism: The Supreme Court's 2008-

2009 Labor and Employment Cases, 13 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'YJ. 253, 262-64 (2009)

(characterizing the decision to reverse summary judgment for the City and grant it to
the plaintiffs as one among a number of examples of the Court's "procedural
extremism").
"' See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
118

Id. at 2677-78.

"' The Court summarized the results of the tests as follows: "Seventy-seven
candidates completed the lieutenant examination-43 whites, 19 blacks, and 15
Hispanics. Of those, 34 candidates passed-25 whites, 6 blacks, and 3 Hispanics. Eight
lieutenant positions were vacant at the time of the examination. As the rule of three
operated, this meant that the top 10 candidates were eligible for an immediate
promotion to lieutenant. All 10 were white. Subsequent vacancies would have allowed
at least 3 black candidates to be considered for promotion to lieutenant. Forty-one
candidates completed the captain examination-25 whites, 8 blacks, and 8 Hispanics.
Of those, 22 candidates passed-16 whites, 3 blacks, and 3 Hispanics. Seven captain
positions were vacant at the time of the examination. Under the rule of three, 9
candidates were eligible for an immediate promotion to captain-7 whites and 2
Hispanics." Id. at 2666 (citations omitted).
The Court held that as a matter of law the tests resulted in a disparate impact by
looking just at the pass rates, which did not tell the whole story of that impact since
simply passing the test would not necessarily lead to promotion during the two-year
life span for using the tests: "The racial adverse impact here was significant, and
petitioners do not dispute that the City was faced with a prima facie case of disparateimpact liability. On the captain exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 64
percent but was 37.5 percent for both black and Hispanic candidates. On the
lieutenant exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 58.1 percent; for black
candidates, 31.6 percent; and for Hispanic candidates, 20 percent. The pass rates of
minorities . .. were approximately one-half the pass rates for white candidates ....
Id. at 2677-78.
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the examination results because of the statistical disparity based on
race-i.e., how minority candidates had performed when compared to
white candidates.",2 0 Since the race of the individual test takers was not
known to the City (or the test takers) when the decision was made, it is
difficult to conclude that acting on that information alone would
constitute intentional discrimination unless acting with mere knowledge
of the racial consequences sufficed to establish intent.1 2 ' Nevertheless, the
Court insisted that the City committed a prima facie case of disparate
treatment discrimination but only against the white test takers: "Whatever
the City's ultimate aim-however well intentioned or benevolent it might
have seemed-the City made its employment decision because of race.
The City rejected the test results solely because the higher scoring
candidates were white." 2
The Court took a substantial leap from finding that the intent of the
City when it made its decision was to avoid an adverse impact on the
minority test takers to finding that the decision not to use the test scores
was intentional discrimination only against those white test takers who
would be promoted if the test scores were not used 23: It did not explain
why the decision was "solely because the higher scoring candidates were
white" when the group of test takers who had scored high enough to be
promoted or promotable included two Hispanics, one of whom was a
plaintiff in the case, and several African-Americans. Further, those test
takers who did not score highly enough to be promoted or be
promotable also included whites, African-Americans, and Hispanics.
What is different from Justice Kennedy's position in Parents Involved is
that in Ricci, the City did not individually identify the test takers when it
made the decision not to use the tests the way the school districts in
ParentsInvolved did. If the governmental actor need not know the racial
identity of the individuals it acts upon in order to trigger disparate
treatment-if acting with knowledge of the racial consequences in the
aggregate is disparate treatment discrimination-that appears to move
the position ofJustice Kennedy toward an absolute color-blind rule.
Knowledge by those affected by the decision that their race is
implicated in the decision also does not appear necessary to establish a

"o Id. at 2673.

See Norton, supra note 112, at 223 (characterizing it as a "deeply contested"
change in the law because the Court "newly defined an employer's culpable mental
state for Title VII purposes, concluding that an employer's attention to its practices'
racially disparate impact is itself evidence of its racially discriminatory intent"); see also
Michael J. Zimmer, Ricci's "Color-Blind" Standard in a Race Conscious Society: A Case of
Unintended Consequences?, 2010 BYU L. REv. 1257.
122 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674.
123 The leap is from the finding that the decision
not to use the scores would
have an adverse impact on all the test takers-white, African-American and
Hispanic-who would have been either promoted or promotable if the test were
used, to a finding that the City committed intentional disparate treatment
discrimination to a subset of that group, the white test takers.
21
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prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination. In Parents
Involved, it did not appear that either the parents or the children who
would be assigned to schools because of their race knew that. Once a
student's first choice of school was not honored, then (if they knew the
assignment policy) the parents and the child knew that there was a
chance that their race would be used to make the school assignment. In
Ricci, all the test takers knew that they faced the risk, depending on how
they did on the test, that they would be either better or worse off if the
test scores were used or not. Also, once the issue of whether or not to use
the test became public because it had an impact on minority test takers,
then the white test takers knew that, as a group, they faced an increased
risk of being worse off if the test scores were not used.124 With that limited
knowledge-that their chance for promotion either went up or down-it
is hard to synthesize Ricci with ParentsInvolved's emphasis on the harm of
individualizing the use of race unless the mere risk of discrimination
suffices." This risk analysis seems quite removed from Justice Kennedy's
language in ParentsInvolved about the "crude" use of individual students
126
as "racial chits" that appeared so important to him.
Like his position in Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy indicated that
not all action taken when its racial consequences are known to the actor
constitutes disparate treatment. Using race when planning what
employment practices to adopt is not disparate treatment:
[We do not] question an employer's affirmative efforts to ensure that
all groups have a fair opportunity to apply for promotions and to
participate in the process by which promotions will be made. But
once that process has been established and employers have made
clear their selection criteria, they may not then invalidate the test
results, thus upsetting an employee's legitimate expectation not to be
judged on the basis of race.... Title VII does not prohibit an
employer from considering, before administering a test or practice,
how to design that test or practice in order to provide a fair
opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their race.

12 Another way of saying this is that the white test takers knew that the decision
not to use the test scores would have a disparate impact on them.
"5 There is authority that the risk of harm suffices to establish an interest
sufficient to bring a claim of discrimination. See Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated
Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City ofJacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993) (finding that an
association of contractors can challenge an affirmative action plan even though its
members faced only a risk of harm if the plan was implemented). If this risk analysis
holds, presumably the minority test takers in Ricci suffered an adverse employment
action when the City first announced that it would use the test, since the risk that the
test would have a disparate impact was real at that point. That risk was realized when
the City finally did use the test scores.
2
Norton, supra note 112, at 226 ("Nowhere [in Ricci] do we see any sign of
[Justice Kennedy's] impassioned rejection in ParentsInvolved of post-racial claims that
downplay the strength of ongoing antisubordination concerns in light of
discrimination's continuing legacy.").
27 Ricci, 129 S.
Ct. at 2677.
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Justice Kennedy's approach for the Court in Ricci is similar to the
position he took in ParentsInvolved in several ways. In both, he divides the
analysis in two. During the planning stages for school siting or for
employment practices, the general consideration of race would not
violate equal protection or disparate treatment. In contrast, the use of
individualized race in Parents Involved and the frustration of the reliance
of test takers in Ricci is disparate treatment discrimination that violates
Title VII. Thus, a defense in Parents Involved that the school board was
acting to provide equal opportunity for all, or in Ricci that the City was
ensuring a fair opportunity for all the test takers, was unavailing because
the use of race in both-individualized to the students in ParentsInvolved
and known at an aggregate level in Ricci-fell on the impermissible side
of the line that Justice Kennedy had drawn. In neither case did it seem
important that the victims did not know they were individually affected.
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Ricci suggests that the violation of an
absolute color-blind rule, even in defense of a claim of disparate impact
discrimination, is unconstitutional. Thus, for him, Title VII's disparate
impact provision in § 703(k) appears to violate equal protection precisely
because it requires that employers know and take account of the racial
consequences of their policies and practices to comply with the law:
Title VII not only permits but affirmatively requires [employer] actions
when a disparate-impact violation would otherwise result. ... Title
VII's disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales,
often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their
policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial
outcomes. That type of racial decisionmaking is, as the Court
explains, discriminatory. "9
For Justice Scalia, the anticlassification underpinnings of his color-blind
rule of equal protection conflict with the antisubordination basis for

See generally Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization:An Emerging
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011) (articulating a
principled basis for the middle ground positions of Justices Powell, O'Connor and
Kennedy as a color-blind limit on the use of race in ways that would otherwise
balkanize the nation along racial lines, but that stops short of proscribing all uses of
race). But see Mark S. Brodin, Ricci v. DeStefano: The New Haven Firefighters Case & The
Triumph of White Privilege, 20 S. CAL. REv. L. & Soc. JUST. 161 (2011); Yoshino, supra
note 8, at 775 (tracing to Justice Powell the development of the present color-blind
rule plus the narrow view requiring proof of 'malice when there is no express
discrimination).
' Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia,J. concurring). He further elaborates, "[tlo be
sure, the disparate-impact laws do not mandate imposition of quotas, but it is not
clear why that should provide a safe harbor. Would a private employer not be guilty
of unlawful discrimination if he refrained from establishing a racial hiring quota but
intentionally designed his hiring practices to achieve the same end? Surely he would.
Intentional discrimination is still occurring, just one step up the chain. Government
compulsion of such design would therefore seemingly violate equal protection
principles. Nor would it matter that Title VII requires consideration of race on a
wholesale, rather than retail, level." Id.
2
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disparate impact law. Since the Constitution trumps statutes, the
disparate impact provisions of Title VII are unconstitutional because of
that conflict. 30 "[RIequiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of
their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial
outcomes" would result in § 703 (k)'s unconstitutionality.
Rather than face the issue of the constitutionality of the disparate
impact provisions of Title VII, the Court made a strained interpretation
of the relationship between the disparate treatment provision in § 703 (a)
and the disparate impact provision in § 703(k) ." Finding that complying
with the disparate impact law violates disparate treatment is
unprecedented."' The Burger Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
interpreted Title VII to include the disparate impact theory and could
not be charged with creating a tension between that theory and disparate
treatment theory. After the Rehnquist Court folded disparate impact
theory into disparate treatment theory in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio,'34 Congress rejected that by amending Title VII when it enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In doing so, Congress obviously did not
recognize any tension between the two theories.
Ricci shows how far the Roberts Court has moved from its immediate
predecessor Courts. Until Ricci, the two bases for Title VII liability are
easily read in conjunction and not in conflict: First, an employer is
prohibited from engaging in intentional discrimination, for example,
firing someone because she is black or never assigning Latinos to overthe-road truck driving jobs, and second, the employer is also prohibited
from using employment practices resulting in an adverse impact on
groups protected by Title VII, such as pen-and-pencil tests, that have not
been validated. Justice O'Connor in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust"'
and the Court in Wards Cove viewed the two provisions as acting in
concert, not in conflict: Disparate impact liability is "functionally
It is interesting that in 1989, the Rehnquist Court decided to interpret Title
VlI's disparate impact law to basically fold it into disparate treatment law. When
Congress codified disparate impact law by adding § 703(k) to Title VII, the only way
the Court could get rid of disparate impact law, and its basis in an antisubordination
perspective on discrimination, is to find it unconstitutional. Justice Scalia'
concurrence in Ricci suggests, if not completely endorses, finding § 703(k)
unconstitutional under a color-blind rule of equal protection. See Lawrence
Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact (unpublished article) (on file with author)
(arguing that § 703(k) is constitutional).
* Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (ScaliaJ. concurring).
11
While acknowledging the background question of the constitutionality of
§ 703(k), the Court made no reference to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to
justify its interpretation of the relationship between § 703(a) and § 703(k).
* See Siegel, supra note 128, at 1285 n.14 ("Ricci asserts, for the first time since
the Court first recognized the disparate impact cause of action . . . that there are
potential conflicts between the disparate treatment and disparate impact liability
frameworks under Title VII.").
.. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
1'

487 U.S. 977 (1988).
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equivalent to intentional discrimination,,is Until Ricci, simply knowing
the racial consequences of a practice and acting to avoid disparate
impact liability was not disparate treatment. In Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,'3 7 Justice O'Connor made it clear in her concurring opinion that
knowing the gender consequences of an action was not by itself disparate
treatment. "Race and gender always 'play a role' in an employment
decision in the benign sense that these are human characteristics of
which decisionmakers are aware ... but [that] by no means could
support a rational factfinder's inference that the decision was made
'because of' sex.' 3 8 Because of Ricci's new interpretation of disparate
treatment discrimination as being triggered when an employer simply
takes action knowing its racial consequences, the Court created the
tension with the disparate impact theory that it then resolved with its
"strong basis in evidence" affirmative defense. 3 9
In sum, in Parents Involved the Court held that the defendants
violated equal protection because the third step of their student choice
systems used the race of individual students to assign them to their
schools. It did not matter that the school districts did this to avoid the
return of de facto segregation. Whether or not the parents or the
children ever knew that their race had been taken into account in the
school assignment of individual students, the public knowledge that
there was some risk that some students would be identified by race
sufficed to trigger the school districts' liability under equal protection. In
Ricci, the defendants took action to avoid the risk of disparate impact
liability; that action violated Title VII's disparate treatment basis for
liability even though, at the time the decision to act was made, the
defendants knew only the aggregate, but not the individual, results of the
test.140 While not knowing their own scores, all the test takers knew that
they had a risk of being promoted or not if the test scores were used and
the correlative risk if the scores were not used. What they did not know
was their actual risk. Both Parents Involved and Ricci involved claims by

Id. at 987.
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Id. at 277.

Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009). "Applying the strong-basis-inevidence standard to Title VII gives effect to both the disparate-treatment and
disparate-impact provisions, allowing violations of one in the name of compliance
with the other only in certain, narrow circumstances. The standard leaves ample
room for employers' voluntary compliance efforts, which are essential to the statutory
scheme and to Congress's efforts to eradicate workplace discrimination. And the
standard appropriately constrains employers' discretion in making race-based
decisions: It limits that discretion to cases in which there is a strong basis in evidence
of disparate-impact liability, but it is not so restrictive that it allows employers to act
only when there is a provable, actual violation." Id. at 2676 (citations omitted).
"' For an argument that Ricci creates a new defense to disparate impact claims,
see Joseph A. Seiner & Benjamin N. Gutman, Does Ricci Herald a New Disparate
Impact?, 90 B.U. L. REv. 2181 (2010).
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whites, as had all prior cases pushing the law toward an absolute colorblind rule.
The stage is now set to begin to discuss Wal-Mart to see if the Court
has moved antidiscrimination law even further from its antisubordination
purposes.
IV. THE WAL-MART V DUKES DECISION
Wal-Mart is the largest retailer and the largest employer in the
United States. It is known for having highly developed data collection
and analysis systems that allows the headquarters and central
management in Bentonville, Arkansas, to keep close tabs on every aspect
of its operations at every one of its thousands of locations.' 2 Using this
highly developed system, which keeps costs to a minimum while
operating at the highest level of efficiency, is the basis for Wal-Mart's
remarkable success. This system also means that Wal-Mart puts pressure
on all parts of its operations to keep costs down, including labor costs.
A putative class of over one and a half million women workers claimed
that this system discriminated against them in pay and promotions by
granting store managers unstructured and unchecked discretion to make
these decisions, while Wal-Mart had the aggregated data showing that
women were paid less than men and were not promoted as quickly as
men. 4 4 The Court refused to certify this as a class action under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 As a backdrop to the discussion of

.4.See L6pez, supra note 9, at 36 ("After [Personnel Administrator v.] Feeney, the
'neutral' laws leniently assessed under intent doctrine never involved government
action that helped minorities; those laws were examined skeptically under
colorblindness. And these 'neutral' laws never involved whites. There have been no
cases alleging the use of race-neutral devices to discriminate against whites.").
1'
See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 600-01 (9th Cir. 2010)
(describing Wal-Mart's operational structure as follows: "As factual evidence, Plaintiffs
presented evidence of the following: (1) uniform personnel and management
structure across stores; (2) Wal-Mart headquarters's extensive oversight of store
operations, company-wide policies governing pay and promotion decisions, and a
strong, centralized corporate culture; and (3) consistent gender-related disparities in
every domestic region of the company. Such evidence supports Plaintiffs' contention
that Wal-Mart operates a highly centralized company that promotes policies common
to all stores and maintains a single system of oversight. Wal-Mart does not challenge
this evidence."); see also Nelson Lichtenstein, Wal-Mart and the New World Order: A
Template for Twenty-First Century Capitalism?,NEw LAB. F., Spring 2005, at 22 (Wal-Mart
has seemingly perfected "the most efficient and profitable relationship between the
technology of production, the organization of work, and the new shape of the
market."); Lesley Wexler, Wal-Mart Matters, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 95, 95-96 (2011).
14 Wexler, supra note 142, at 103. See also Nelson Lichtenstein, Wal-Mart's
AuthoritarianCulture, N.Y. TIMES,June 22, 2011, atA21.
...Dukes, 603 F.3d at 577-78, 578 n.3, 601, 606.
11 Looked at as a procedural decision, Wal-Mart radically diminishes the ability
to bring private class action claims of either disparate treatment or impact
discrimination.
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what impact Wal-Mart might have on substantive antidiscrimination law,
the following subsection will lay out how the case would play out if preWal-Mart law applied. That will then be juxtaposed with what the Court
said in Wal-Mart.
A.

The Application of the ConventionalSystemic Theories to Wal-Mart

Both systemic disparate treatment and systemic disparate impact
theories of discrimination theoretically apply to the way Wal-Mart made
its pay and promotion decisions. Disparate treatment will be discussed
first because it is the broader of the two theories, followed by disparate
impact.
1. The Pre-Roberts Court Systemic DisparateTreatment Law
Disparate treatment law involves proof that the employer engaged in
intentional discrimination in the sense that the factfinder is asked to
draw the inference that the employer's action was "because of"
discrimination. The first 1 uestion is whether the employer has express
policies of discrimination.
Two policies were scrutinized in Wal-Mart.
One was an express policy prohibiting discrimination 15 and the other was
Wal-Mart's policy of giving unstructured discretion to the managers of
individual stores to set pay and to make promotions. While both were
express, neither was discriminatory on its face."' The information
See Green, supra note 56, at 407 n.45 ("It is not unusual for plaintiffs in
lawsuits involving allegations of bias carried out in systems of subjective decision
making to allege both systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.").
"' There is a right to a jury trial in disparate treatment cases as well as the
availability of compensatory and punitive damages, neither of which is available in a
disparate impact action. Further, at least as to a pattern or practice action of disparate
treatment, no affirmative defense is available. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
6

States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977).
' Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, 32 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 487 (2011) ("In a pattern or practice claim
... there [is] no agent or explicit policy at issue, but rather intent [is] reflected in the
identified pattern that [is] attributable to the institution as a whole."); see also Green,
supra note 56, at 442 ("To succeed on a systemic disparate treatment claim, plaintiffs
much prove that employment decisions within the defendant organization were
regularly based on a protected characteristic.. . . [P]laintiffs who rely on statistics to
prove systemic disparate treatment must convince the fact finder than an observed
statistical disparity was due to internal disparate treatment ... rather than to ...
factors external to the organization.").
"' For an example of an employment policy that was expressly discriminatory,
see UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (finding that prohibiting
fertile women but not fertile men from jobs involving exposure to lead is an express
policy of sex discrimination).
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011) ("Wal-Mart's
announced policy forbids sex discrimination.").
' See Green, supra note 56, at 409 n.63 (criticizing reliance on the mere
existence of a formal employer nondiscrimination policy to rebut statistical evidence
of a pattern or practice of disparate treatment discrimination).
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regarding how discretion was used was part of the data collected,
retained, and analyzed in Bentonville. A policy of unstructured
decisionmaking is the type of subjective decisionmaking the Court, in
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,"12 found to be subject to potential
disparate impact liability. While Watson was a disparate impact case,
presumably the policy of using discretion can also be the focus of a
disparate treatment claim if it could be shown that its operation or
administration constitutes a pattern or practice of discrimination. While
the pay and promotion decisions were made by the local store managers,
the focus of the systemic disparate treatment claim would be against WalMart itself. In other words, the case would not be directly about the
actions of the store managers and whether they individually
discriminated. Instead, it would be based on what Wal-Mart itself did
when the aggregation of all those individual decisions raised a strong
suspicion that discrimination was occurring at the local level in some
stores and regions.
The evidence, which was unchallenged, showed that women filled
70% of the hourly jobs but only 33% of management jobs, with most
promotions coming from the pool of hourly workers. Further, it took
women longer than men to rise into the management ranks and the
higher in the management hierarchy the fewer the women. Finally,
women were paid less than men in every region and that salary gap
widened over time, even for men and women hired into the same jobs at
the same time. 5 3 Thus, women employees were adversely affected by the
pattern of operation of the discretion policy. Whether or not any
individual woman was a victim of pay or promotion discrimination
because of decisions made by her store manager, all women working at
the local stores faced the risk that their managers would discriminate
against them and Wal-Mart would do nothing about the actions of its
agents. In a systemic disparate treatment claim, the question is whether
this pattern was "because of' discrimination.
The basic statistical evidence of how women did compared to men in
pay and promotions would be the first step toward challenging the way
the discretion policy, neutral on its face, nevertheless operated as a
pattern or practice of systemic disparate treatment discrimination.5 Like
the mere existence of the subjective discretion policy, these statistics may
1
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) ("[A]n
employer's policy of leaving promotion decisions to the unchecked discretion of
lower level supervisors should itself raise no inference of discriminatory conduct.").
153 The opinion of the Court in Wal-Mart did not mention these statistics
that
start the analysis of a systemic disparate treatment challenging an employer's pattern
or practice of discrimination, but Justice Ginsburg did quote the district court's
finding of facts. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2562-63 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
See also supranote 142.
15 Green, supra note 56, at 403 ("Discrimination is one reasonable inference to
be drawn ... from a disparity in pay or promotion that is unlikely to occur by
chance.").
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not be, by themselves, sufficient to support a finding of systemic disparate
treatment discrimination. While the extreme nature of the simple
statistics in Teamsters-the "inexorable zero"-was sufficient to support
drawing the inference that the employer's standard operating procedure
was to discriminate, the basic statistics in Wal-Mart were not quite so
extreme. The clear and uncontested shortfall for women in pay and
promotions, while certainly suspicious, may not by itself undermine
alternative, non-discriminatory explanations in the way that evidence of
an "inexorable zero" does. 5 5
More evidence would likely be needed to support a finding that the
shortfall for women in pay and promotions was "because of'
discrimination. Hazelwood and Bazemore established that sophisticated
statistical techniques can be used to help isolate whether discrimination
is implicated, even where the basic statistical evidence is less stark than
the "inexorable zero" in Teamsters. Given the huge data pool in WalMart-pay and promotion data for all the workers in all the stores of the
largest employer in the country-these techniques become increasingly
useful since their power increases as the size of the data pool increases.
For the issue of the promotion of women versus men, binomial
distribution, the technique used in Hazelwood, could be used to
determine whether the null hypothesis that sex and promotions were
unrelated should be accepted or rejected. This involves the comparison
of the total number of men and women in the labor pool for the job with
their representation among those promoted. If there is a statistically
significant relationship between sex and promotions, that relationship
makes it extremely unlikely to be the result of chance. Finding such a
relationship does not, as a matter of probability statistics, prove the
shortfall in promotions was "because of' sex. But finding such a
statistically significant relationship can be the basis for drawing the
inference of discrimination.
Multiple regression analysis, the technique used in Bazemore, is ideal
for the question of pay discrimination since a continuous variable, like
pay, is needed. Multiple regression analyzes the effect of all the variables
that are thought to be relevant to pay-time in service, relevant
experience in other employment, job evaluations, education, etc.-along
with gender. Holding all the variables other than sex constant, the

"

Furaco Construction Corp. v. Waters explains why evidence of an "inexorable

zero" in the face of workers who were available to do the job supports drawing the
inference of intentional discrimination. "[W]e are willing to presume
[discrimination] largely because we know from our experience that more often than
not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons,
especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an
applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is
more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some
reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race." 438 U.S.
567, 577 (1978) (finding a sample size too small to be able to produce useful
statistical analysis).
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technique shows whether there is a statistically significant relationship
between pay and sex. If there is, the null hypothesis that sex and pay are
unrelated should be rejected. That sex and pay are shown to be related
can be the basis for drawing the inference of discrimination that the pay
differences between women and men are "because of' sex.
Expert statisticians are able, given the constraints of the available
data, to apply these techniques, variations of them, and additional ones
to analyze the data."6 In litigation, both sides typically use statistical
experts, which results in a battle of experts. In Wal-Mart, plaintiffs'
experts concluded that sex and pay and promotions were related at a
statisticaly significant level in every region and across all regions of the
company. E In contrast, Wal-Mart's expert sliced and diced the
aggregated data into separate subsets, each made up of the small pool of
data from a particular department at a particular store. Doing this
reduced or eliminated the power of the technique used since the smaller
the data pool the less power the technique has. With the data sliced and
diced into such small pools, it is no surprise that she found there was no
statistically significant relationship found between sex and pay. Therefore
she accepted the null hypothesis that sex and pay and promotions were
unrelated. 5 8 While dividing the company-wide data into these very small
data sets may have been the only way to find that there was no statistically
significant relationship between sex and pay, doing so rendered the
studies neither relevant nor probative of what the aggregated data
showed. It was the aggregated data that was the basis for deciding
whether or not Wal-Mart was liable for disparate treatment
discrimination.
Finding that sex and pay and promotion have a statistically
significant relationship supports, but may not require, drawing the
inference of discrimination. To further support drawing the inference of

" For an interesting explanation of how a variety of statistical techniques could
be used in Wal-Mart, see Joseph L. Gastwirth et al., Some Important Statistical Issues
Courts Should Consider in Their Assessment of Statistical Analyses Submitted in Class
Certification Motions: Implicationsfor Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 10 LAw, PROBABILITiY & RisK 225
(2011). See generally Steven L. Willborn & Ramona L. Paetzold, Statistics Is a Plural
Word, 122 HARv. L. REv. F. 48 (2009), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org

/media/pdf/willbornpaetzold.pdf.
"' See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 604 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing
plaintiffs' expert statistical testimony as follows: "Dr. Richard Drogin, Plaintiffs'
statistician, analyzed data at a regional level. He ran separate regression analyses for
each of the forty-one regions containing Wal-Mart stores. He concluded that 'there
are statistically significant disparities between men and women at Wal-Mart in terms
of compensation and promotions, that these disparities are widespread across
regions, and that they can be explained only by gender discrimination.' Dr. Marc
Bendick, Plaintiffs' labor economics expert, conducted a 'benchmarking' study
comparing Wal-Mart with twenty of its competitors, concluding Wal-Mart promotes a
lower percentage of women than its competitors." (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 154 (N.D. Cal. 2004))).
'" Dukes, 603 F.3d at 604-05.
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discrimination, the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart introduced more expert
testimony, based on "social framework" theory. That testimony looked to
the structure and corporate culture of Wal-Mart that led individual store
managers as well as management up at the to to more readily engage in
unconscious and stereotyped discrimination. Wal-Mart could have, but
did not, respond with its own expert testimony that, for example, their
women employees in hourly positions are less interested in the type of
jobs one gets promoted into even though they are higher paying jobs,
and that this lack of interest 6 o better explains the shortfall of women in
terms of pay and promotions than does a finding of sex discrimination.16
Anecdotal evidence can also be useful in deciding whether or not to
draw the inference of discrimination. In Teamsters, the Court referred to
the claims of individual employees that they were victims of the
defendant's race discrimination, but held that such evidence was not
always necessary. Such evidence has now appeared to be more significant
because of the later decision in EEOC v. Sears, where the absence of any
anecdotal evidence in a pay and promotion case appeared to be
crucial. While relatively sophisticated statistical techniques become
more powerful as the size of the data pool increases, the power of the
story of discrimination by any one individual decreases. ?3 So, while
presumably necessary to tell a good story by giving context to a large scale
pattern or practice action, anecdotal evidence works best to bolster
testimony to show that what the social framework literature suggests
164
would happen, actually did happen to some individuals.
Particularly useful for plaintiffs is the juxtaposition of the tight
control Wal-Mart exercised over every aspect of its operations at every
one of its locations with its policy of leaving pay and promotion decisions
to local managers, and then not acting to control the exercise of that
discretion when the data showed such a significant impact on women.
Presumably, if Wal-Mart could show that it had a good reason for

''
See id. at 601. As to social framework evidence, the Court of Appeals set forth
the conclusions of plaintiffs expert: "Dr. Bielby concluded that: (1) Wal-Mart's
centralized coordination, reinforced by a strong organizational culture, sustains
uniformity in personnel policy and practice; (2) there are significant deficiencies in
Wal-Mart's equal employment policies and practices; and (3) Wal-Mart's personnel
policies and practices make pay and promotion decisions vulnerable to gender bias."
Id.
16
See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding this
kind of expert testimony significant).
"' Since the case focused on whether the plaintiffs had established the basis to
certify a class action and did not directly focus on the substantive liability of Wal-Mart,
it would not be foreclosed from introducing such evidence if the case went to trial on
the substantive issues.
12 Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d at 310-11.
"6 See Selmi, supra note 148, at 506 ("Plaintiffs need to craft a story, a narrative,
that explains how stereotyping has, in fact, affected the defendants' workplace.").
'6 Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d at 311-12.
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exercising tight control over everything else, but also a good reason not
to exercise any control over pay and promotion decisions, such a showing
would make it more difficult to draw the inference that the shortfall of
women's pay and promotions was "because of' sex.'6 5 The existence of
another, nondiscriminatory explanation makes it more difficult to
convince the factfinder that this was a pattern of discrimination.
Correspondingly, the failure of Wal-Mart to explain the difference in how
it managed every other aspect of its operation down to the local level and
how it managed pay and promotions would bolster the case for drawing
the inference of discrimination. Basically, the claim is that Wal-Mart's
policy of discretion took advantage of the conscious and unconscious bias
of the store managers to lower the labor costs by discriminating in pay
and promotions for women. That is discrimination.
Assuming the factfinder draws the inference that Wal-Mart had
engaged in systemic disparate treatment discrimination-the standard
operating pattern of its system of delegated discretion resulted in
discrimination against women in pay or promotions-then there is no
need to go to the alternative systemic theory: disparate impact
discrimination.'66 But if the record does not support finding that
intentional discrimination caused the substantial shortfall of pay and
promotions for women, that result does not foreclose taking the next
step of applying systemic disparate impact theory to the case.
2. Systemic DisparateImpact Law

There are two rimary differences between the two systemic theories
First, disparate treatment turns on the issue of
of discrimination.
whether the employer acted "because of' discrimination, a finding not
necessary to make out a disparate impact case. Second, disparate impact
turns on the identification of a specific employer practice that has an
l
Since the impact was admitted, a way of looking at the question is whether
"Wal-Mart would only engage in employment discrimination to the extent that it
serves efficiency goals." Wexler, supra note 142, at 103. The argument would be that,
if Wal-Mart acted "because of' efficiency, it did not act "because of sex." But Wal-Mart
has "relative indifference to worker quality .... In such a system, Wal-Mart's failure to
reward managers for giving raises to the most deserving hourly workers and for
promoting the best workers ... makes sense. This relationship alone does not explain
the reasons why discrimination in pay and promotion occurs, but it helps suggest why
Wal-Mart has taken so few actions over time to ameliorate it." Id. at 114.
'
While the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) defense, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e) (1), is available as an affirmative defense to policies that expressly
discriminate against women, the establishment of systemic disparate treatment
discrimination by showing that the standard operating practice is a practice of
discrimination leaves no defense because the employer, having denied it
discriminated, would be hard pressed once a pattern or practice of discrimination is
established to subsequently argue that the discrimination was so necessary that it was
a BFOQ.
1
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, the Court recognized that the ways of
proving disparate treatment discrimination are different from proving disparate
impact discrimination. 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988).
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adverse impact, while a pattern or practice case of disparate treatment is
not so limited; it can focus on the bottom line result of all of the
employer's practices.
The first question is whether the employer's policy of granting local
store managers unstructured and uncontrolled discretion to make pay
and promotion decisions is an employment practice. Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust established that a policy of subjective decisionmaking is
The next
also an employment practice subject to disparate impact.
question is whether this practice produced a disparate impact on a class
protected by Title VII.co Even if the evidence is insufficient to support a
finding of disparate treatment discrimination, the rather dramatic
shortfall for women revealed in the basic statistics supports a finding that
Wal-Mart's discretion policy operated as an employment practice
resulting in disparate impact against women. Such a showing shifts the
burden of persuasion to Wal-Mart to demonstrate that this practice was
job related and consistent with business necessity.'7 1 Since some
discretion is arguably involved in making most employment decisions,
Wal-Mart's practice of granting store managers' discretion as to pay and
promotions might be found to be job related unless its unstructured and
uncontrolled discretion undermined that conclusion. ' Even if the policy
"1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) does provide that, with a certain showing,
plaintiffs can challenge the bottom line statistics of the result of all of employer's
employment practices: "With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment
practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A) (i), the
complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment
practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can
demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process
are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be
analyzed as one employment practice."
9

487 U.S. at 990.

Wal-Mart could try to prove that the practice of unstructured discretion did
"not cause the ... impact," in which case, Wal-Mart "shall not be required to
demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k) (1)(B) (ii). Since the impact is still present, the next question would be whether
other, related practices caused it. Two of them might be "that pay differentials ...
were often based on whether one was in a hardline (male) department or softline
(female) department . . ." Wexler, supra note 142, at 109. Another practice that may
have caused the impact in terms of promotions was Wal-Mart's requirement that, to
be promoted, the worker would have to be ready to relocate. Id. at 109-10.
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) sets out the requirement for a prima facie case
as well as the affirmative defense standard if a prima facie case is established: "An
unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this
subchapter only if-(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that
the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity . . . ."
' See Richard Thompson Ford, Discounting Discrimination: Dukes v. Wal-Mart
Proves that Yesterday's Civil Rights Law Can't Keep Up with Today's Economy, 5 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV. 69, 78 (2011) ("State-of-the-art management science suggests that giving
11
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as it operates is found to be job related, Wal-Mart must still prove that it is
consistent with business necessity. Since there are many alternatives to
the unstructured discretion used by Wal-Mart-from completely objective
practices such as tests, assessment systems that involve structured scoring
by trained observers, or simply imposing a structure to the exercise of
that discretion-it would seem to be difficult to conclude that a practice
of unstructured and unchecked discretion is actually "necessary" to the
operation of Wal-Mart's business. 7 3
In sum, the law of systemic disparate treatment discrimination would
apply to challenge Wal-Mart's policy of granting store managers
unstructured discretion to set pay and promotions because it operated as
a pattern or practice of discrimination. Whether the challenge would be
successful depends on whether, looking at all the evidence in the record,
such evidence supports drawing the inference that the pattern was
"because of' sex. Disparate impact theory would also be available because
the operation of the discretion policy is an employment practice. That
would leave the question whether the evidence supports a finding that
the employer's practice resulted in an adverse impact on women-which
was not in dispute-and that the unstructured policy of discretion was
either notjob-related or not consistent with business necessity.
B.

How the Court Appeared to Apply the Systemic Theories in Wal-Mart

The thrust of this Article is that in Wal-Mart the Roberts Court did
not simply apply the law of systemic discrimination but that it changed
that law or, at least, foreshadowed changes that the Supreme Court and
the lower courts will make in subsequent cases. In indicating how to
analyze the class action question, the Court indicated that it was
necessary to look to the underlying substantive law. That law frames the
claims that can raise questions of law or fact common to the class.
Deciding whether or not to certify the class, the Court said:
Frequently that. . . will entail some overlap with the merits of the
plaintiffs underlying claim. That cannot be helped. '[T]he class
determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed
in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiffs cause of
action.' . . . In this case, proof of commonality necessarily overlaps

local managers, who are closest to the specific challenges, the latitude to respond to
them often leads to dramatic improvements in productivity and efficiency. [But]
[t]hese innovations ... may be more 'vulnerable' to bias than formal and objective
job criteria....").
m7Even if Wal-Mart could succeed in proving job relatedness and business
necessity, the plaintiffs could try to establish an alternative that Wal-Mart could have
used that would serve its purposes without causing disparate impact. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k) (1)(A) (ii) provides: "the complaining party makes the demonstration
described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice
and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice."
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with respondents' merits contention that Wal-Mart engages in a
pattern orpracticeof discrimination. 7 4
Articulating substantive law when deciding a class action question is,

of course, not the same as actually deciding what the substantive law is. If,
however, the substantive law is important to deciding the class action
question, it would seem necessary for that substantive law to be accurately
set forth and applied.
At any rate, the Court proceeded to quote a footnote in General
7
' a class action decision, where
Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,1
important to the
law proved
antidiscrimination
substantive
determination of the class action issue. ' Falcon tried to bring an "across
the board" class action to challenge not only the employer's hiring
discrimination but also its discrimination in promotions. The Court
rejected the "across the board" approach to class action and emphasized
the need of an underlying question of fact or law common to all claims.
It did indicate two instances in which both hiring and promotion
discrimination could be challenged in one class action because they
shared common questions of law or fact. One was if the employer used
the same employment test for hiring as promotion and the other was
where the employer used "entirely subjective decisionmaking processes"
for its employment decisions. While Falcon involved two possible
exceptions to the new rule banning "across the board" class actions, the
Court in Wal-Mart appeared to view these exceptions as the only ways in
which discrimination cases could be brought as class actions, an
approach not at issue in Falcon. Because no "testing procedure" was
involved in Wal-Mart, the Court found that, "[t]he first manner of
Falcon
bridging the gap obviously has no application here ....
discrimination-hiring
claims of
involved two very different
discrimination and promotion discrimination-so there was no common
question of fact and law since claims of promotion discrimination
generally are quite different from claims of hiring discrimination. In Wal-

174

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-52 (2011) (quoting Gen.

Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)).
''
457 U.S. 147 (1982).
171 "Falcon suggested
two ways in which that conceptual gap [between the
individual plaintiffs claim and the existence of a class of persons who suffered the
same injury] might be bridged. First, if the employer 'used a biased testing procedure
to evaluate both applicants for employment and incumbent employees, a class action
on behalf of every applicant or employee who might have been prejudiced by the test
clearly would satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a).'
Second, '[s]ignificant proof that an employer operated under a general policy of
discrimination conceivably could justify a class of both applicants and employees if
the discrimination manifested itself in hiring and promotion practices in the same
general fashion, such as through entirely subjective decisionmaking processes."' WalMart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (alteration in original) (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at
159 n.15).
117 Id. at 2553.
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Mart, the pay and promotion claims were closely related to each other
because all the store managers had been granted the same unstructured
discretion for both pay and promotion decisions. Further, those
promoted came from the pool of hourly employees, and a promotion
typically included a raise in pay. The bridge between pay and promotion
was the common question of how the policy of unstructured and
unchecked discretion was administered and controlled as to both pay
and promotion. It might be argued that by his way of describing the first
use of a common test exception in Falcon,Justice Scalia meant to limit
class action claims of disparate impact discrimination to challenges of
tests-a procedural decision-or to limit disparate impact cases to test
issues-a substantive law decision. Because § 703(k) describes the scope
of disparate impact claims broadly to cover challenges to all
"employment practices," not just the subset of those practices involving
employment testing, arguing that Wal-Mart changed the substantive law
of Title VII would be such a stretch that would not likely be accepted by
lower courts.
Falcon's second exception to the general rule that a plaintiff claiming
discrimination cannot represent victims of hiring
promotion
discrimination in a class action is where a policy of "entirely subjective
decisionmaking" was used both for promotions and hiring. It was not
contested that Wal-Mart used the same policy of unstructured discretion
for both pay and promotion decisions. Yet, Justice Scalia found there was
no "'significant proof' that Wal-Mart 'operated under a general policy of
discrimination.' 1 78 That is true if he means by "general policy of
discrimination" an express policy of discrimination. While the policy of
using unstructured discretion by store managers was a general policy, it
was not expressly discriminatory. Instead the thrust of plaintiffs' case is
on the "operation" of a policy that authorized "entirely subjective
decisionmaking" in both pay and promotion decisions. In other words,
the common question was whether the way the policy of discretion
worked amounted to a pattern or practice of discrimination.
Judge Ikuta, in her dissent below, would narrow systemic disparate
treatment claims to express policies of discrimination and to situations
where a policy neutral on its face was shown to have been adopted by top
management with an intent to discriminate.' 9 If adopted, that would
undermine the use of statistical and other evidence to establish direct

17

"'

Id. at 2553 (quoting Falcon,457 U.S. at 159 n.15).
This approach would limit Wal-Mart's direct liability to express policies that

discriminate and, under respondeat superior, to the intentionally discriminatory

actions of its top managers in establishing a neutral policy that operated to
discriminate. See Green, supra note 56, at 408, 410 ("Justice Scalia [like Judge
Ikuta] ... frames systemic disparate treatment theory as imposing entity liability only
for individual moments of disparate treatment. . . .").
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employer liability for a pattern or practice of discrimination.180 In none of
the prior systemic disparate treatment or impact cases-from Griggs and
Teamsters and Hazelwood to Watkins and Wards Cove-was there any
mention that employers were not directly liable for their discrimination.
The Court did not expressly adopt Judge Ikuta's elimination of an
employer's direct liability for pattern or practice cases of disparate
treatment or impact. 8' But the confusing organization of the Court's
opinion and its unclear discussion of substantive discrimination law may
make Judge Ikuta's narrow view in fact what the Court has done, or will
do, to systemic disparate treatment law. Justice Scalia starts his analysis by
saying that the "only corporate policy that the plaintiffs' evidence
convincingly establishes is Wal-Mart's 'policy' of allowing discretionby local
supervisors over employment matters." 8 2 He then characterized this
policy as 'just the opposite of a uniform employment practice . .. it is a
policy against having uniform employment practices."'" This conflates the
policy that was uniformly applicable at all of Wal-Mart's stores with the
way individual store managers exercised that discretion and whether the
data aggregated from all those individual decisions established a pattern
of discrimination. Then he characterizes this policy as "a very common
and presumptively reasonable way of doing business-one that we have
said 'should itself raise no inference of discriminatory conduct."8 The
Court in Watson, which is the source for saying the existence of a
subjective decisionmaking process is not by itself discriminatory, went
ahead and held that such a process could be the basis of disparate impact
liability. Watson did not accept that subjective decisionmaking was a
"presumptively reasonable way of doing business" if the practice had a
disparate impact and was not shown to be job related and consistent with
business necessity. This suggests that Watson has been, if not overruled,
undermined.
Justice Scalia then changed direction from plaintiffs' case aimed at
Wal-Mart's potential direct liability to focus on whether or not the
individual store managers had engaged in discrimination:
[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any corporation-and
surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex
discrimination-would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria
for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.
Others may choose to reward various attributes that produce
"' This evidence might still be used to prove intentional discrimination of top
level managers for which Wal-Mart would be liable under respondeat superior.
'. She would limit pattern or practice actions to evidence of "a company-wide
policy of discrimination ... implemented by discretionary decisions at the store and
district level." Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 637 (9th Cir. 2010) (Ikuta,
J., dissenting). While not accepting the extreme position ofJudge Ikuta,Justice Scalia
later quotes her opinion favorably. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2555.
182 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
183
Id.
"8 Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988)).
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disparate impact-such as scores on general aptitude tests or
educational achievements. And still other managers may be guilty of
intentional discrimination that produces a sex-based disparity. In
such a company, demonstrating the invalidity of one manager's use
of discretion will do nothing to demonstrate the invalidity of
another's.
Justice Scalia gives no authority for these factual assertions, but the
various ways he describes that individual store managers might exercise
the discretion the company's policy gave them is beside the point. What
is important is the aggregate data reflecting all of the individual decisions
made by the store managers when they all exercised the discretion WalMart gave them. The question common to all the women plaintiffs
claiming to represent the class was whether they each faced the risk of
discrimination in pay and promotions because of the way this whole
system operated; that is, it was systemic disparate treatment by Wal-Mart,
not just a collection of claims of individual instances of discrimination by
individual store managers. Through his obscure analysis, Justice Scalia
avoided discussing the real issues in the case.
An argument might be made that this approach means that Title VII
only redresses individual disparate treatment claims, and no systemic
claims can be brought except for those challenging express policies of
discrimination.'8 In other words, the argument would be that Teamsters,
Hazelwood, and Bazemore all have been sub silentio overruled, thereby
abolishing the theory of pattern or practice disparate treatment.18 Some
support for that substantial change in the law might be found in Justice
Scalia's quote from ChiefJudge Kozinski's dissenting opinion below, that
the members of the class "have little in common but their sex and this
lawsuit."'8" It is simply not true that the only thing the class members had
in common was their sex and this lawsuit. They all also had in common
that they all faced the risk of discrimination in pay and promotions
because of Wal-Mart's policy of giving store managers unfettered
discretion.

'5 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2554 (citation omitted).
"' Limiting Title VII to individual claims reduces the enforcement of it to a
minimum. For example, proving individual claims of discrimination against Wal-Mart
can be problematic: "Wal-Mart ... exhibits all of the defining features of the
contemporary service-sector employer in exaggerated form: it has a large low-wage
workforce, high turnover, a decentralized management structure, and it evaluates its
employees based on highly subjective criteria. ... These features ... make it hard to
apply the individual civil rights model. . . ." Ford, supranote 172, at 76.
18 Title VII expressly includes pattern or practice cases. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a)
(2006). See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with ParticularAttention to
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2010) (describing how the Roberts Court has
overruled cases sub silentio).
"8 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2557 (emphasis added) (quoting Dukes v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 652 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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After all that confusion and misdirection, Justice Scalia finally
recognized that "giving discretion to lower-level supervisors can be the
basis of Title VII liability."""' He characterizes the basis of that claim as
being "under a disparate-impact theory," referring to Watson.'90 Then,
rather than developing the disparate impact claim, that is, whether the
record supported a finding that this discretion was an employment
practice that resulted in an adverse impact on women, he again shifted
focus back to view the case as a systemic disparate treatment case. But he
does so in a way that is radically different from prior law.
Not only does Justice Scalia not start with the basic statistics that
showed the shortfall of pay and promotions for women, he never
mentions this uncontested evidence that triggers a pattern or practice
disparate treatment or disparate impact case. Nor does the opinion start
by looking to the more sophisticated statistical analyses of the aggregate
data about pay and promotions. The pre-Wal-Mart authority would have
started a pattern or practice case with all of this statistical evidence.9
Instead, he initially approaches the issue from the viewpoint of the "social
framework" testimony of one of plaintiffs' experts. He rejects that
evidence as a basis for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination
because the expert could not calculate whether "0.5 percent or 95
percent of the employment decisions at Wal-Mart might be determined
by stereotyped thinking" that results from the structure of Wal-Mart's
operations. This reveals a complete failure to understand what social
framework is and why it can be relevant to pattern or practice cases of
systemic disparate treatment discrimination. Social framework evidence is
not a technique used to show the statistical significance of data because it
is not a statistical technique based on probability theory. Instead, it is
used to describe how certain employment structures and corporate
cultures can lead to stereotyping and other forms of unconscious
discrimination. In other words, evidence showing the existence of these
structures and cultures at a particular employer is relevant and probative
because that supports drawing the inference of discrimination based on
all the evidence in the record, including all the statistical evidence.19 3
With his treatment of the social framework evidence, Justice Scalia
appears to be suggesting that to be probative each item or type of
'" Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2555.
""s Id. (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)).
.' Cf Selmi, supra note 148, at 481 ("[I]t is no longer acceptable to rely on
statistics without providing a context to establish a pattern or practice claim . . . .")
' Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2554 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, the Court strongly suggested, without deciding, that in determining whether

to certify a class action such testimony was subject to the standards for expert
testimony that had been established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993), at the class certification stage and not just at trial. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2553-54.
11 See Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework
Evidence in Employment DiscriminationClass Actions, 78 FoRDiHAM L. REv. 37 (2009).
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evidence must, by itself, be sufficient to prove discrimination. In other
words, he seems to be slicing and dicing the evidence in the record to
eliminate the relevance of any evidence that by itself does not prove
discrimination.'" He avoids looking at the evidence in the whole record,
which is the only way that an inference of discrimination could ever be
drawn. The question, at least before Wal-Mart, was whether, reviewing all
the evidence in the record, including the statistical, anecdotal, and other
evidence, it is reasonable to draw an inference that Wal-Mart engaged in
a pattern or practice of pay and promotion discrimination. Social
framework testimony can be relevant and probative on that ultimate
question of fact because it can help to explain how some corporate
structures and cultures, like Wal-Mart's, are prone to allow
discrimination.
Having not even mentioned the basic statistical evidence showing a
substantial shortfall for women in terms of pay and promotions, Justice
Scalia does then move to the sophisticated statistical analysis of that data.
He concedes that the multiple regression studies prove that "there are
statistically significant disparities between men and women at WalMart."'6 5 Nevertheless, he rejects this as probative because the studies are
"insufficient to establish that [plaintiffs'] theory can be proved on a
classwide basis.... A regional pay disparity, for example, may be
attributable to only a small set of Wal-Mart stores, and cannot by itself
establish the uniform, store-by-store disparity upon which the plaintiffs'
theory of commonality depends."'9 " Further, assuming this evidence
established "a pay or promotion pattern that differs from the nationwide
figures or the regional figures in all of Wal-Mart's 3,400 stores, that would
still not demonstrate that commonality of issue exists.. . . Merely showing
that Wal-Mart's policy of discretion has produced an overall sex-based
disparity does not suffice."' 97
This analysis fails to address plaintiffs' actual claim. They do not
claim that there is a uniform, store-by-store disparity in pay and

"' To reach the conclusion, for class action purposes, that there were no
common questions of law or fact, Justice Scalia may have thought he needed to slice
apart the evidence to undermine commonality that would be found in the record as a
whole.
" Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2555 (quoting the conclusion of the
statistician who did the multiple regression studies, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603
F.3d 571, 604 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Another expert
"compared work-force data from Wal-Mart and competitive retailers and concluded
that Wal-Mart 'promotes a lower percentage of women than its competitors."' Id.
(quoting same).
1 Id. But see Selmi, supra note 148, at 508-09 ("The primary point of a regression
analysis is to measure the importance of variables that are relevant to the underlying
decisions, and the significance of the variables cannot be readily identified by
focusing solely on isolated or individual cases.").
' Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2555-56. This final sentence is as close as the
Court gets to referencing the basic statistical showing of that disparity.
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promotions where each store manager discriminated in the same way for
all women. Instead, the claim is that the operation of the policy of
granting store managers unfettered discretion produced substantial
impact on women in pay and promotions that continued unchecked. To
say this from the point of view of the harm to the women employees, it is
that all the women in all the stores uniformly faced the risk that the
managers of the stores in which they worked would discriminate against
them without any review mechanism. That not all of them had the risk
realized does not support the conclusion that the way the discretion
policy was implemented was not probative and relevant to the question of
a pattern or practice of systemic disparate treatment discrimination by
Wal-Mart. 9 8
Based on all of this, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had
failed to establish the underlying substantive basis of a claim of systemic
disparate treatment discrimination that would justify finding, as required
by Rule 23(a), the existence of "questions of law or fact common to the
class." In the process of reaching that conclusion as to plaintiffs' systemic
disparate treatment discrimination claim, the Court touched on the
disparate impact claim twice, with neither discussion developing the
theory in any full way. Justice Scalia first adverted to disparate impact
discrimination by acknowledging that "in appropriate cases, giving
discretion to lower-level supervisors can be the basis of Title VII liability
under a disparate-impact theory."'" But rather than determining whether
the exercise of this discretion in the aggregate had a disparate impact on
the pay and promotion of women employees, the Court cut off that
analysis because a claim of disparate impact discrimination "does not
lead to the conclusion that every employee in a company using a system
of discretion has such a claim in common.,, 200 This conclusion is directly
at odds with the nature of a disparate impact claim-impact, by
definition, means that some, but not all, members of the group are
adversely affected by the challenged employment practice. This may be

"' See id. at 2556. The Court next dealt with the anecdotal evidence, indicating
that it was "too weak to raise any inference that all the individual, discretionary
personnel decisions are discriminatory." Id. To reach this conclusion, it used a novel
approach: The Court compared the ratio of specific accounts of racial discrimination
to the size of the class-here, it was about 1-in-12,500-with the 1-in-8 ratio in
Teamsters, and concluded that the anecdotal evidence was inadequate since the ratio
was too low. Id. One wonders whether this 1-in-8 ratio will become a requirement
before any anecdotal evidence will be considered probative. If so, that would
substantially increase the burden on plaintiffs seeking to represent classes. The Court
recently adopted an economic substantive due process limit on punitive damages
using a ratio with compensatory damages. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
9 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2554 (internal quotation marks omitted).
200

Id.
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suggesting that disparate impact claims can never be brought as class
201
actions.
The second reference to the disparate impact theory of
discrimination comes later in the opinion when the Court concludes that
a "discretionary system [that] has produced a racial or sexual disparity is
not enough. '[T]he plaintiff must begin by identifying the specific
employment practice that is challenged."' 202 Watson had held that a policy
granting discretion to make employment decisions was an employment
practice that was subject to disparate impact attack. Nevertheless, Justice
Scalia finds that "[m]erely showing that Wal-Mart's policy of discretion
has produced an overall sex-based disparity does not suffice., 203 The only
way that this can be true is by finding that, despite Watson, a policy of
discretion cannot be an employment practice for purposes of disparate
impact analysis without regard to how much adverse impact the
operation of the policy produces-the existence of an employment policy
which is neutral on its face shelters a challenge to the operation of it
because the policy is not a practice. This is puzzling, especially since
Justice Scalia gives no authority or reason for it. It does, however, put the
continuing viability of Watson in jeopardy.
V. DOES WAL-MART CHANGE THE SYSTEMIC THEORIES OF
DISCRIMINATION?
An argument can be made that Wal-Mart did not change the
substantive systemic theories of discrimination because the case only
decided whether or not to certify a class action, making it exclusively a
procedural, not a substantive, decision. While the underlying substantive
law is implicated in deciding the class action question, the decision as to
its impact on the class action questions might be taken as having nothing
to do with substantive antidiscrimination law qua substantive law.
Juxtaposing Wal-Mart with prior substantive law reveals such a substantial
difference that it is hard to accept that the decision has changed the law
so radically. To the extent Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, discussed
substantive law, the discussion was in the context of the class action
questions and was consistent with extant law. She did not suggest that the
majority was changing the law, but that it had misapplied it. Since WalMart, the Ninth Circuit has applied it to deny class certification without
indicating that there was a substantive law dimension to Wal-Mart.1o

20'
Given his position in his concurring opinion in Ricci that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k) is unconstitutional, see supra text accompanying note 129, perhaps Justice Scalia
is suggesting that disparate impact cases cannot be brought at all. Thus, disparate
impact is not worthy of much discussion.
(alteration in original) (quoting
202 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2555
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)).
20 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2556.
204 Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Based on that and the fact that Wal-Mart is a class action, lower
courts may well reject an argument that the discussion of the substantive
law in Wal-Mart reflects what the law is. A recent example of a lower court
doing that is the Second Circuit's decision in Briscoe v. City of New
Haven,20 a disparate impact case arising out of the same promotion test
that was at issue in Ricci. In Ricci, Justice Kennedy included an enigmatic
paragraph that could be read as precluding any subsequent actions
against the City, such as Briscoe's, arising out of the test that was at issue
in Ricci.20 While the district court dismissed Briscoe's suit based on that
language in Ricci, the Second Circuit reversed, finding that, given the
complexity of preclusion law, the Court could not have meant to change
it with a single, undeveloped and enigmatic paragraph in a decision that
involved no preclusion issues.2o' As to the substantive law of systemic
discrimination, the Wal-Mart opinion is so confused and oddly organized
that it may be viewed as having no effect on the law.
From the
viewpoint of those concerned with an antisubordination view of the
purpose of antidiscrimination law, treating Wal-Mart as not implicating
substantive discrimination law would be good news.
The less good news is if the approach the Court took is treated as
impacting substantive systemic discrimination law. Justice Scalia could
have, but did not, simply indicate that the substantive law discussed was
necessary to decide the class action issues but did not reflect all of the
substantive law. At a minimum, Wal-Mart can be viewed as a
foreshadowing of the undermining of the litigation structure of systemic
discrimination law.209 By the way the Court slices and dices the evidence
in the record, it appears to require that each item or type of evidence
must by itself support drawing the inference of discrimination,
independent of whether the record as a whole supports drawing that
inference. 2 10 Doing this allowed the Court to undercut the relevance both
of social framework and anecdotal evidence. This new approach appears
to reject prior law that disparate treatment discrimination is an ultimate

Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 654 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2011).
The paragraph in Ricci is: "Our holding today clarifies how Title VII applies to
resolve competing expectations under the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact
provisions. If, after it certifies the test results, the City faces a disparate-impact suit,
then in light of our holding today it should be clear that the City would avoid
disparate-impact liability based on the strong basis in evidence that, had it not
certified the results, it would have been subject to disparate-treatment liability." Ricci
v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009).
20' Briscoe, 654 F.3d at 200-03, 208-09.
2" That the organization of the opinion may have focused on
the class action
issues supports the conclusion that substantive law was unaffected.
200 See Friedman, supra note 187, at 3-4 (describing
how the Roberts Court has
overruled cases sub silentio).
2"o The separation of the evidence into separate, unrelated types or items
may be
explained by the need, for purposes of the class action issues, to try to show that there
were no common issues of law or fact for purposes of the Rule 23(a) determination.
20

2o6
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question of fact based on all the relevant and probative evidence in the
record.2 1' Absent the type of statistical evidence of an "inexorable zero" in
Teamsters or an admission against interest by a high company official that
might, by itself, support drawing the inference of discrimination, it would
be rare to find one piece or type of evidence that independently proves
systemic disparate treatment discrimination. If taken seriously, that
interpretation of Wal-Mart would eliminate most systemic disparate
treatment pattern or practice cases. This is at odds with Justice Scalia's
prior approach in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the same-sex
harassment case, where he explored various types of arguments and
evidence that same-sex harassment might be found to be discrimination
because of sex and concluded: "Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff
chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct ...
actually constituted

'discrimina[tion] ...

because of ...

sex.' 212 The

organization and structure of the Wal-Mart opinion, which from the
point of view of substantive discrimination law appears almost random,
suggests either that the Court did not mean it to have any effect on
substantive law, or if it did, the result would be to undermine by stealth
pre-existing disparate treatment law. Leaving open that second possibility
means that systemic disparate treatment law is vulnerable.
In addition to possibly undermining the litigation structure
underpinning systemic disparate treatment law, the Court may have
overturned or undermined the Burger Court decisions in Teamsters,
Hazelwood, and Bazemore dealing with the use of statistical evidence in
pattern or practice cases by not even referring to the basic statistical
evidence and by undercutting the more sophisticated statistical
techniques that it did discuss. The Court did not expressly adopt Judge
Ikuta's approach of limiting the scope of systemic disparate treatment to
proof that the employer adopted an express policy of discrimination2 or
proof that the top employer officials intended to discriminate when they
adopted an employment policy that was neutral on its face. If the way the
Court treated statistical evidence reflects what the law is now, that would
seem to come quite close to adopting Judge Ikuta's position. The lack of
clarity in the opinion makes it difficult to determine what courts might
take it to mean in subsequent cases.
The backdrop for undermining the logic and rationale for systemic
disparate treatment law, at least as to pattern or practice cases, is the
repeated focus of the Justices on individual acts of discrimination by the
store managers as if that was the only way discrimination occurred.

is also at odds with the general approach to factfinding.
"' Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Sens., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (alteration
in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)) (finding that sexual orientation is not
protected by Title VII, but same-sex harassment could be the basis of drawing the
inference of sex discrimination).
21 Justice Scalia does appear to hint that the mere existence of a formal policy
prohibiting discrimination may limit pattern or practice cases.
". It
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Justice Scalia did not see the link the policy of discretion had to its
operation that resulted in a substantial impact on women as shown by the
data aggregating all the individual pay and promotion decisions. The
apparent failure of some of the Justices to understand that discrimination
can occur beyond individual employment decisions becomes clear from
some of the questions that were asked during the oral argument
ChiefJustice Roberts- How many examples of abuse of the subjective
discrimination delegation need to be shown before you can say that
flows from the policy rather than from bad actors?"
justice Kennedy: [Ilt's hard for me to see that the-your complaint
faces in two directions. Number one, you said this is a culture where
Arkansas knows, the headquarters knows, everything that's going on.
Then in the next breath, you say, well, now these supervisors have too
much discretion. It seems to me there's an inconsistency there, and
I'mjust not sure what the unlawful policy is.21
justice Scalia: I don't-I'm getting whipsawed here. On the one hand,
you say the problem is that they were utterly subjective, and on the
other hand you say there is a-a strong corporate culture that guides
all of this. Well, which is it? It's either the individual supervisors are
left on their own, or else there is a strong corporate culture that tells
them what to do.w
justice Scalia: What do you know about-about the unchallenged fact
that the central company had a policy, an announced policy, against
sex discrimination, so that it wasn't totally subjective at the
managerial level? It was, you make these hiring decisions, but you do

Recently, the Chief Justice has been quoted as saying that he thinks that
scholarship is not "particularly helpful for practitioners and judges," and "[w] hat the
academy is doing as far as I can tell ... is largely of no use or interest to people who
actually practice law." Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An EmpiricalAssessment
21"

of the Supreme Court's Use of Legal Scholarship, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 2) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884462. His approach, and the approach of the other
Justices in the majority in Wal-Mart, appears to confirm that they do not read legal
scholarship-but that perhaps they should. As to the underpinnings of
discrimination, "scholars have developed models of organizational misconduct that
adopt a more situationist approach to wrongdoing and acknowledge that wrongdoing

can be driven by context and can occur even absent individual, amoral actors."
Green, supranote 56, at 435.
' Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct.

2541 (2011) (No. 10-277).
.. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 215, at 27-28. But see L6pez, supra
note 9, at 23-24 (criticizing the Manichean approach the Court uses to analyze
discrimination cases).
217 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 215, at 29. This either/or approach
exhibits a fundamental lack of understanding of pattern or practice cases of systemic

disparate treatment by Justice Kennedy. Social framework testimony would be
relevant to this question. Further, it appears that the existence of a formal policy
prohibiting discrimination in some way insulates the operation of other policies from
challenge as patterns or practices of discrimination.
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not make them on the basis of sex. Wasn't that the central policy of
'218
the company?
ChiefJustice Roberts This company has a thousand stores, and sure
enough in a thousand stores you're going to be able to find a goodly
number who aren't following the company's policy [to not
judgment in a way
discriminate], who are exercising their subjective
219
that violates the right to equal treatment.
justice Alito: So, you have the company that is absolutely typical of the
entire American workforce, and let's say every single-there weren't
any variations. Every single company had exactly the same profile.
Then you would say every single company is in violation of Title VII? 22
justice Scalia: [What] your answer assumes is if there is a disparity
between the advancement of women and the advancement of men, it
can only be attributed to sex discrimination[?]2
While Justices may ask questions to probe the position of an advocate
that do not reveal anything about the position they actually hold, these
questions seem to reveal exasperation at their inability to understand
plaintiffs' case and may be premised on a strongly held but unexpressed
assumption that discrimination occurs only at the level of individual
decisionmaking. The law has for a long time been otherwise, so this is
curious. A possible explanation is that these Justices fear that looking
beyond individual discrimination to find broad scale discrimination
would result in employers having too great an incentive to use quotas to
guarantee a racial or gender balance, echoing Justice O'Connor in
Watson and the Court in Wards Cove.

Id. at 30. This question may suggest that for Justice Scalia unconscious bias
2'
and actions based on stereotypes do not occur because the individual store managers
follow the nondiscrimination policy by not discriminating. This is at odds with
Watson.
...Id. at 35-36. This question appears to be based on a fear of racial or gender
balancing-a fear that has been at the base of the anticlassification approach since
Bakke and Watson. For a call to interpret antidiscrimination law to keep up with

today's workplace, see Ford, supra note 172, at 69 ("[Wle often can't pinpoint
discrimination accurately enough to blame a specific individual perpetrator, or to
identify a specific individual victim, even though we can identify more general
patterns of discrimination.").
220Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 215, at 41-42. But see Green, supra
note 56, at 413 (arguing that limiting systemic disparate treatment claims to proof
that the employer's women workers "suffer significantly more discrimination than

they would suffer in the [labor] market as a whole" is a fundamental change to prior
law). This is similar to the argument the Court rejected in Hazelwood, that the
statistical comparison of the representation of African-American teachers was to be
made to the students at the school and not at the labor market for teachers.
21 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 215, at 42. A showing of disparity,
such as the basic statistics in Wal-Mart, is only the start of the analysis absent evidence
of the "inexorable zero," as in Teamsters. The question is whether, looking at the
record as a whole, this impacted women because of sex.
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As to systemic disparate impact law, the refusal of the Court to treat
the operation of a neutral employment policy as an employment practice
subject to disparate impact analysis would limit rather severely the type of
practices that could be challenged using disparate impact theory.
Further, there is an argument that the Court may have sub silentio
overruled Watson. On one hand, Justice Scalia acknowledges that an
employer policy of subjective decisionmaking can be challenged as
disparate impact discrimination. On the other hand, he appears to block
looking at the operation of the policy by finding that an employer policy
is not an employment practice. Without being able to introduce evidence
of how a policy operates, it is impossible to show that the operation
results in impact.
A question the Court did not deal with at all was the implication that
Ricci has for this case. In Ricci, the Court found the City had committed
systemic disparate treatment by deciding not to use the test scores
because it knew the consequences in terms of the three racial groups of
whatever decision it made. Ricci is at odds with Feeney, where the
establishment of purposeful discrimination-that the challenged action
was "because of," rather than "in spite of," discrimination-required
much more evidence than mere knowledge of the gender consequences.
The fact that in Feeney "the [I]egislature . . . could [not] have been

unaware that most veterans are men [or that] the adverse consequences
of this legislation for women were unintended, in the sense that they
,,222
was
were not volitional or in the sense that they were not foreseeable,
racial
Yet
knowing
the
purposeful
discrimination.
not sufficient to prove
consequences of the action it took sufficed to establish disparate
treatment discrimination in Ricci.2 23 Wal-Mart aggregated the data about
pay and promotions, so it is chargeable with knowing the gender
consequences of the way its system of unstructured discretion operated.
If the approach the Court took in Ricci applies, such "knowledge" would,
without more, suffice to establish disparate treatment because of sex. Yet
the Court does not explain why Ricci does not apply to Wal-Mart. It may

22
2'

Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278 (1979).
Before Ricci, the color-blind rule made it easy for whites to challenge actions

expressly undertaken to address the subordination of racial minority groups, while
the high threshold to prove that actions neutral on their face were the result of
purposeful discrimination made it difficult for members of groups that have been
subordinated since the social mores now inhibit admissions against interest by the
governmental actors. With the ease with which the Court in Ricci found the City liable
for purposeful discrimination by the mere showing that it knew the racial
consequences of its actions, it is now much easier to prove discrimination where the
act is neutral on its face. Indeed, the color-blind and the purposeful discrimination

rules may be merging in the sense that it is still easy for whites to challenge
affirmative efforts to help racial minorities, but it is also easy for members of

subordinated groups to prove discrimination based on the easily established fact that
the actor knew the racial consequences of its action. If the Ricci approach only applies

when whites sue, that would appear to violate the color-blind rule of law the Court
claims to apply both in equal protection and statutory antidiscrimination law.
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be that while Ricci was a race case, Wal-Mart involved a claim of gender
discrimination and the Court is not ready to treat the knowledge of the
gender consequences the same way it treats knowledge of the racial
consequences of an action. Perhaps the fact that the dispute in Ricci had
become a hot public topic very early in the dispute-and did not in WalMart-makes a difference. Further, it may be that the Court is intent on
maintaining the preexisting dichotomy between the easy proof when
whites challenge actions explicitly taken to address racial subordination
and the difficult proof when members of racial minority groups
challenge actions that are neutral on their face. This, of course, stands
antidiscrimination law on its head, but that had been happening well
before Ricci and Wal-Mart. Finally, it may be that the obvious empathy the
Justices in the majority felt toward the white plaintiffs in Ricci and the
absence of any indication of empathy for the women in the Court's
opinion in Wal-Mart made the Court stretch well beyond preexisting law
to decide in favor of the white plaintiffs in Ricci, but also to recast the law
to find against the women in Wal-Mart.
VI. CONCLUSION
It may be that the Court in Wal-Mart meant "only" to render class
action claims of discrimination extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
bring. The decision, however, does include intimations that the systemic
theories of discrimination law are heading toward a major change
curtailing their application.
The way to know what the real impact Wal-Mart has on the two
systemic theories of discrimination would be to bring an action raising
these substantive questions but not to bring it as a class action. While the
individual plaintiffs in Wal-Mart can do this on remand, a more likely
224
advocate would be the EEOC. If it would now bring a pattern or
practice case along the lines of Wal-Mart, claiming that a policy of
unstructured discretion operated as a pattern or practice of disparate
treatment discrimination or as an employment practice that produced a
disparate impact on the pay and promotion of women, the class action
dimensions of Wal-Mart would not be implicated, so the case would turn
on whether the precedent preceding Wal-Mart is still good law or whether
Wal-Mart had actually changed the law. It may be that the EEOC does not
want to find out the answer.
If such a hypothetical case decided that Wal-Mart set forth the
substantive law of systemic discrimination, then, in conjunction with the
decision's decimation of class actions, there would be as to protected
classes, "no damn cat, no damn cradle."

224 The EEOC has authority to bring pattern or practice actions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-6(a), (c) (2006).
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